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Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation?

MEMORY AND POLITICS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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By STEVEN MAJSTOROVIC

Any optimism generated by the Dayton peace accords in late 1995 was substantially eroded by events during the spring and summer of 1996. These events marked a protracted and tragic endgame in the former Yugoslavia. The flight from Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs in February and March 1996 was the first indication of things to come. During the summer, refugees who tried to return to their former homes were harassed and attacked by paramilitary gangs. The early focus was on the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs, but now it is apparent that a policy of ethnic apartheid is being pursued by all sides in Bosnia.¹

It was hoped that elections planned for September 1996 would thwart and erode the anti-democratic policies of ethnic separatists. But an early attempt at elections as a vehicle for conflict resolution in the divided city of Mostar produced an impasse in which Croats from the western part of Mostar refused to recognize election results that gave a slight majority to the Muslims from the eastern part of the city.² When the European Union (EU) threatened to leave Mostar, calling it the "biggest crisis"³ since the Dayton peace accords, U.S. President Bill Clinton personally pressured Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and the situation was at least temporarily resolved.⁴ However, Mostar's former Serb residents, who made up 20 percent of the prewar population, were completely left out of the election process in Mostar and repatriation is extremely unlikely.⁵

The Bosnian election problems were compounded when Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic threatened to boycott the elections unless indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic resigned his office as president of the Bosnian Serb Republic and was extradited to the Hague war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

By threatening to reimpose sanctions against Serbia, American envoy Richard Holbrooke forged a compromise when he coerced Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic into obtaining Karadzic's resignation and retreat from public life. But Karadzic is yet to be arrested, and his political influence behind the scenes is still substantial.⁶ Moreover, most of the indicted war criminals roam free throughout Bosnia, Croatia, and rump Yugoslavia.

The complexity of the Yugoslav conflict illustrates that the genesis of the war and the issues of ethnonational⁷ identity that fed the flames of conflict are far from being understood in any way that reflects some set of shared perspectives among scholars and pundits. For example, the exodus from Sarajevo by the Serbs in February and March 1996 seems to defy logic and rationality. One analytic perspective contends that the war is a product of "ancient hatreds" rooted in primordial identity and consequently any national group that falls under the political control of another is in mortal danger. The experience of some Serbs who left Sarajevo certainly reinforces this contention, as they ran a gauntlet of hostile Bosnian Muslims, supposedly bent on revenge.⁸ An opposing perspective views the war as the product of elite manipulation and fear-mongering by ethnic entrepreneurs who fanned the flames of hatred for their own purposes and who manipulated ethnonational identity issues that are themselves just a product of an "invented tradition."⁹ Analysts who adhere to the second perspective suggested that Serbs should take hold of their senses, accept the guarantees of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, ignore their leader's warnings, and stay in Sarajevo. Despite assurances, however, the Serbs who stayed in Sarajevo have been continually threatened.¹⁰ Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic promised that the violence against Serbs in Sarajevo would be

stopped. But unfortunately, most of the Serbs in Sarajevo now want to leave, including many who were loyal to the Bosnian government during the war.¹¹

Clearly, the Yugoslav conflict is an almost ideal laboratory for addressing some of the central questions that scholars of nationalism and ethnicity pose. Those who espouse a primordialist conception of national identity have ample evidence to support their position, while the constructionists also have abundant data that support their contention that national identity is essentially an artificial and modern phenomenon that is often at the mercy of ambitious leaders who manipulate and instrumentalize ethnonational identity.

This article argues that prevailing analyses of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia that focus either on a notion of ancient, primordial hatreds rooted in centuries-old identities, or on the premise that ethnic identity in the Balkans is a modern social construction that has been instrumentalized by political elites,¹² miss the essential nature of the ongoing struggle. Historical memory constrains the options that leaders exercise in conflict creation and in peacemaking. Ethnic identity in the former Yugoslavia, however, has also been and will continue to be somewhat flexible and politically adaptive but only within a framework that does not threaten the constraints imposed by myth and memory. The constraints on masses and elites imposed by historical experience are particularly applicable for the Serbs, somewhat less so for the Croats, and even less so for the Bosnian Muslims. The Balkan conflict has both premodern, primordial characteristics and modern, constructed/instrumentalized elements in which ancient antagonisms (sometimes hatreds) and modern politics have both contributed appreciably to the tragedy, and an overemphasis on either perspective misrepresents the nature of ethnic conflict and politics in the former Yugoslavia.

ISSUES OF ETHNONATIONAL IDENTITY

Both the primordialist and constructivist perspectives inform the debate over whether the essence of a nation is historically rooted or is a modern, artificial creation. What needs to be considered is that ethnonational identity is continually reformulated in an iterative process in which memory and myth shape and limit the boundaries of social construction. This process had been labeled *primordialization*¹³ and is by

its nature an unending process that is both rooted in antiquity and nurtured by modernity.

The debate between the primordialist notion of ethnonational identity and the argument that this identity is socially constructed is a needlessly constructed dichotomy in itself. Analyses that highlight a type of primordial fundamentalism¹⁴ in the work of Geertz¹⁵ and Shils¹⁶ often simplify the primordialist perspective as one that sees ethnic identity as eternal and inflexible, an ontological given.¹⁷ Although there are primordial perspectives that are sociobiological in orientation and do articulate ethnic identity as an ontological given,¹⁸ a common sense approach to the debate might be useful.

A first step in resolving the dichotomy between ethnonational identity as a given and identity as constructed or manufactured is to substitute the term "premodern" for "primordial" and "modern" for "constructed." Anthony Smith's work is concerned with establishing that ethnic groups and nations existed long before the formation of nation-states and the ideology of modern nationalism.¹⁹ This contention is extremely important for understanding the competing claims of Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. All of these ethnonational groups refer to a "Golden Age" when their nation was the epitome of cultural achievement. Moreover, the maximum boundaries claimed today by these groups are the ones that were temporarily achieved during the zenith of their respective Golden Ages.²⁰ Smith convincingly argues that modern nations do have their antecedents in antiquity. He does not deny that today nations are modern. But he does insist that many of the fundamental characteristics of the modern nation existed long before the advent of nationalism:

We find in premodern eras, even in the ancient world, striking parallels to the modern idea of national identity and character, in the way Greeks and Romans looked on people who did not share their cultures or come from their city-states; in the way in which ancient Egyptians looked upon Nubians and Asiatics; and in Mesopotamian and Biblical distinctions drawn between different peoples. . . . In the ancient world, we find movements that appear to resemble modern nationalism in several respects, notably a desire to liberate territories conquered by aliens, or to resist foreign encroachments. . . . Are we then really justified in regarding nations and nationalism as purely modern phenomena?²¹

Smith has also considered invention, imagination, and most importantly, reconstruction in

the processes of the mythmaking and legend building that are so central to the process of primordialization.²² Further, Smith has now used the term "geology" to examine the re-creation and reconstruction of the past, which is the essence of primordialization.

[Smith] recognizes the role of nationalists in national mobilization but stresses that nationalists are not social engineers or mere image makers as modernist and post-modernist accounts would have it, but rather social and political archaeologists whose activities consist in the rediscovery and reinterpretation of the ethnic past and through it the regeneration of their national community.²³

Although terms such as "re-creation" and "reconstruction" are useful, I suggest that they are still too artificial and unnecessarily rooted in the constructivist orientation and terminology, while the notion of primordialization implies a process that is more clearly tied to history and yet is capable of constant renewal. The term "geology" and the notion of political archaeologists are, however, very relevant to the Balkans. These terms depict a cultural milieu in which political leaders are constrained and limited in their capacities to manipulate and instrumentalize ethnonational identity. Ethnic entrepreneurs have to confront the reality of shared historical experience, and the emotional symbols available for political manipulation cannot just be invented out of thin air but must have socio-historical resonance.

Nineteenth-century nationalism in Europe and twentieth-century nationalism in the post-World War II, decolonized Third World have generally produced multiethnic nation-states. These states are almost inevitably dominated by a single ethnic group.²⁴ In reaction, ethnic groups outside of the state apparatus have become politicized and highly aware of their collective interests. "Within these boundaries, the question was to whom the new states belonged."²⁵ The notion of who owned the state is critical because in the former Yugoslavia no ethnic group predominated consistently, although the Serbs were a plurality of the population. When Yugoslavia broke up into new states, the issue was that Serbs were a substantial minority in the new states. As the president of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia once remarked, "Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?"

The problem of dualism also creates ethnopolitical conflict in the nation-state. There is a significant ambiguity in the relationship be-

tween the state and the various ethnonational groups that are incorporated into it. The state disseminates a picture of a nation that can transcend and subsume the differences between political allegiance to the state and ethnonational identity. However, very few states have succeeded in making the state and nation congruent.²⁶ This dualism also results in an ideological conflict between the political ideal of the nation-state and the historical reality of the nation. In interwar Yugoslavia, the attempt to create congruence between nation and state led to pronouncements that a Yugoslav identity was in the process of creation. These naive assumptions were inspired by oversimplified policy approaches that emphasized ethnocultural similarities and the inevitable convergence of Croat, Slovene, and Serb identity. After World War II, the Communists tried to construct a socialist national identity that transcended ethnicity by embarking on Yugoslavianism campaigns. Like the interwar efforts to fashion a common identity, these efforts were in vain and in fact only precipitated greater identity differentiation.²⁷

Walker Connor strongly asserts that ethnicity is generally an independent variable and social formation whose behavior can be manifested by the dimensions of language, religion, and class.²⁸ But those dimensions are themselves not the essence of ethnic identity or of the forces that drive ethnic politics to such intense levels of political conflict over the issues surrounding those dimensions. Connor advances the proposition that ethnicity is a form of shared identity that is subjectively defined through historical memory, myth, and shared experience.²⁹

It is the intangibility of this subjective and historically experienced bond that leads Connor to conclude that language, religion, and economics/class are epiphenomenal and that the essence of ethnicity and its relationship to politics will remain amorphous and resistant to analyses that depend on objective categories to explain ethnopolitical behavior and conflict. Connor laments that few scholars have confronted the nature of the ethnonational bond and criticizes others who have little appreciation for the emotional and psychological hold that ethnonational identity has on the members of the group.³⁰ He contends that one critical issue that many scholars miss is that the objective history of an ethnonational group is irrelevant for understanding the critical subjective essence of ethnic identity:

It is not *what is*, but what people *believe is* that has behavioral consequences. And a subconscious belief in the group's separate origin and evolution is an essential ingredient of ethnonational psychology. A nation is a group of people characterized by a myth of common descent. Moreover, regardless of its roots, a nation must remain an essentially endogamous group in order to maintain its myth.³¹

Rothschild notes that it would not be useful, or even possible, to utilize a strictly subjective framework and separate ethnonational identity from religious, linguistic, or other dimensions.³² He feels that if these dimensions were peeled off it would be difficult to see what would be left to examine and understand. The subjective and historically experienced nature of ethnic identity is, however, precisely what drives ethnic conflict in Bosnia, "for nationalism, like other profound emotions such as love and hate, is more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational analysis."³³ Royce resolves the difference between subjective and objective ethnic identity markers and suggests that while the ethnic group identifies itself subjectively and historically, other ethnic groups and third party scholars tend to use objective criteria.³⁴ Consequently, from a conflict resolution and analytic perspective it must be understood that ethnic groups usually talk past each other and use objective criteria to generalize about the "other" while saving subjective and historical categories to describe the experiences of the "we" or "us."

It is clear from the subjective and historical perspective that ethnic identity is both rooted in history and is subject to social engineering. But even an advocate of the modern notion of a nation, Hobsbawm,³⁵ who argues strongly that states make nations and that nations do not make states, still presents a chapter on "proto-nationalism" that could easily be integrated in Anthony Smith's *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Benedict Anderson sees modern nations as artificial, imagined communities. For Anderson, the decline of religion and the explosion of information through the printed word have become necessary to transcend death by imagining communities that are both sovereign and limited and with which anonymous individuals can identify. Thus, through printed communication, people can artificially share a sense of posterity, shared psychological space, and cultural homogeneity.³⁶ Although Anderson's argument is somewhat esoteric, the idea of a printed word that stresses property rights and the market to psychologically fill needs

under secular capitalism is not too esoteric to comprehend. In other words, it is the communication between members of a particular group that creates a sense of shared psychic space, a shared subjective identity. In a similar vein, Shils refers to this sense of shared identity as a "collective self-consciousness."³⁷

Despite Anderson's constructivist position, however, much of his effort involves a detailed description of the historical events, myths, legends, and real or imagined experiences that are part and parcel of the construction project. What seems to be evident in the whole primordialism versus constructivism debate is the obvious fact that ethnic identity is malleable, but not infinitely malleable, and that an ethnonational identity cannot be completely imagined without something to stimulate the imagination. *Identity is not produced upon a blank slate, and ethnic groups do not suffer from historical Alzheimer's disease. There is historical clay that needs to be reshaped, and the shape of the clay in a previous epoch lends a constraining factor to the political elites in a subsequent historical juncture*; in the case of the former Yugoslavia, is a key to understanding the maintenance of adversarial and competing histories. The result of this continual process of identity construction and reconstruction is the process of primordialization.³⁸

In other words, primordialization is primarily concerned with creating, re-creating, or enhancing an identity that is subjective and historically rooted. The upshot of all this is that some ethnic groups, with a longer history and thus a larger, and perhaps unwieldy, product of identity-supporting historical experience, might be less able to adapt to changing circumstances; in the case of Yugoslavia it is the Serbs who are the most rooted, or stuck, in the historical mud. For the Serbs, more than for the Croats or Muslims, the parameters of construction and reconstruction become narrower with each historical iteration of identity reinforcement, or primordialization.

The instrumentalist perspective sees ethnic identity as a dependent variable that is shaped by certain independent, objective processes. Hobsbawm contends that agnosticism is the best approach in trying to establish criteria for defining the nation. He believes that single categories such as common territory, cultural traits, common history, ethnicity, and language are insufficient.³⁹ These categories happen to be very similar to Stalin's definition of a nation: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable com-

munity of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture."⁴⁰ Although Hobsbawm considers these objective criteria, he still dismisses them as "fuzzy, shifting, and ambiguous."⁴¹

The alternative to an objective definition of ethnic or national identity is a subjective one. But Hobsbawm warns that a subjective definition can lead the "incautious into extremes of voluntarism which suggests that all that is needed to be or create or recreate a nation is the

In addition to being distinguished from each other by self-defined differences in tribal custom and culture, the South Slavs were further differentiated by the split in the Christian church.

will to be one; if enough inhabitants of the Isle of Wight wanted to be a Wightian nation, there would be one."⁴² Despite Hobsbawm's admonition, however, it is precisely the subjective and historically experienced nature of a nation and its extreme voluntarism that we see in the former Yugoslavia, and it is this nature that is central for an understanding of ethnonational identity.

Rabushka and Shepsle argue that ethnicity is used instrumentally in electoral politics within plural societies, as it was in the secessionist elections in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.⁴³ Although they never address the question of ethnicity as a dependent or independent variable, their work implies that the process of ethnic outbidding by elites and rational ethnic voting by individuals is an instrumental use of ethnicity in which the political process is shaped by ethnicity and the political process in turn shapes ethnic identity. Consequently, instrumentalism by political elites⁴⁴ is an intervening or mediating force that combines with the process of primordialization. This combination strongly suggests that ethnonational identity is both a dependent and an independent variable and the relationship between the primordialization process and instrumentalist forces of political elites is, like the relationship between the primordialist and constructivist dimensions, reciprocal or interdependent.⁴⁵

MEMORY AND MYTH IN SERBIAN, CROATIAN, AND BOSNIAN MUSLIM ETHNONATIONAL IDENTITY

When the term "Balkan politics" is conjured up, a mental picture that many people might have is one of incessant conflict, ethnic tinderboxes, and terrorist plots. This stereotypical view of Balkan politics is not wholly inaccurate. The Balkans have historically been a crossroads for conquest and occupation. The area that is now Yugoslavia was settled by the migration of Slavic tribes during the sixth century. Those tribes were independent until the beginning of the twelfth century, when the Croats yielded to Hungarian political dominance, and until the beginning of the fifteenth century when the Serbians were defeated by the Ottoman Turks. External rule from Austria, Hungary, Italy, or Turkey lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century, although in a series of revolts the Serbs had formed an independent state by the middle of the nineteenth century.

In addition to being distinguished from each other by self-defined differences in tribal custom and culture,⁴⁶ the South Slavs⁴⁷ were further differentiated by the split in the Christian church. As a consequence, the Croats and Slovenes identified with Roman Catholicism, while the Serbs were under the jurisdiction of Byzantium and had formed by the thirteenth century an independent Serbian Orthodox Church. This division between East and West was reinforced when the Eastern Orthodox Serbs fell under Turkish rule, while the Croats and Slovenes answered to Rome and Hungary, and eventually to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, when the South Slavs were brought into a common state in 1918, the stage for ethnonational conflict had been set by a thousand years of history.

Serbian identity can best be understood as a combination of three historical experiences: the memory of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the subsequent five hundred years of servitude and resistance against the Ottoman Turks; the successful revolts against the Turks early in the nineteenth century that culminated in an independent Serbian state by the middle of the century; and the role of the Serbs as allies of the West in two World Wars.

By the fourteenth century, the Serbs under Tsar Dusan had grown into a medieval empire that spanned the Balkans from the Adriatic to Western Bulgaria and to most of Albania and some areas in northern Greece. After his death in 1355, centralized power started to ebb, and

various Serb nobles started to unravel the system set up by Dusan. In 1371, however, Prince Lazar came to power and a temporary recentralization of control was established. This short period ended at Kosovo Polje (The Field of Blackbirds) on 28 June 1389.⁴⁸

The battle between the Serb forces of Prince Lazar and the Ottoman Turks was at the time perceived as either a pyrrhic victory for the Turks or indecisive. The Serbian state survived for another seventy years before finally succumbing to Ottoman rule. However, the cataclysmic nature of a battle in which Prince Lazar and his son were beheaded, the Turkish Sultan Murad disemboweled by the Serbian knight Milos Obilic, and in which there were horrific losses on both sides (over 100,000 deaths in an eight-to-ten-hour battle) created a myth-making apparatus that has shaped Serbian consciousness to this day.⁴⁹

The battle decimated the Serb nobility and cost the Ottomans dearly. Almost immediately, Serbian poets, priests, and peasants started to propagate the notion of Christian martyrdom by the Serbian people, Prince Lazar, and Milos Obilic. The primordialization of the event had all the elements of a passion play played out in real life. Interestingly enough, the perspective of the Ottoman Turks only reinforces the Serbian myths:

Yet this Ottoman view in some ways mirrors traditional Serbian views. Both the Ottoman and Serbian accounts emphasize the battle's cataclysmic nature. Both traditions have martyrdom as a theme.⁵⁰

Added to this vision shared between the Serbs and the Turks, the battle itself is routinely listed in historical surveys as one of the most important events in history. The result of all this valorization is an identity marker that is so rooted in real historical events that it is almost impossible for Serbs to escape its ubiquitous presence in Serbian identity.

Also a part of the Kosovo myth is the tale of migration by Serbs from Kosovo, the failed attempts to migrate back over a period of centuries,⁵¹ and the final triumphant return to Kosovo in 1912.⁵² Taken together, these events, which were kept alive by the Serbian Orthodox church in the liturgy⁵³ and by traveling troubadours who annually embellished the story in a ever-growing epic poem ("The Kosovo Cycle"),⁵⁴ suggest that even the horrible events in Bosnia may have been less destructive than the potential for catastrophe in the Serbian province of Kosovo that is today 90 percent Albanian.

The memory of an independent state that was relinquished to form the Kingdom of South Slavs is also a critical part of Serb identity. The theme of successful revolt and emancipation dominates the mythicizing of the Balkan Wars.⁵⁵ Finally, the Serbian role in World War I and World War II completes the picture. Serbs suffered enormous losses in both wars and continually stress their part in the Allied victories, comparing their role to Croat, Bosnian Muslim, and Albanian collaboration. In particular, the role of General Draza Mihailovich and the Chetnik resistance in World War II is highlighted, as archival evidence has suggested a reassessment of Tito and the role of the partisans.⁵⁶

Surprisingly, Serbs do not consider the genocidal policies of the Croatian Ustasha state and their Bosnian Muslim allies during World War II as an important element of Serbian identity.⁵⁷ Instead, the events are often used as a way to stereotype all Croats and Muslims by both Serb masses and elites. In particular, the Ustasha- and Muslim-led genocide of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia in World War II has been the key to understanding Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb propaganda and military mobilization strategies against Croats and Muslims in the contemporary period. Both Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader, have used the events of World War II to successfully demonize Croats and Muslims in the eyes of the Serbs.

Croatian identity also has a memory of a medieval kingdom, but one that peacefully gave up its sovereignty to the Hungarian crown in 1102. The project of identity primordialization by the Croats has been to present events since 1102 as evidence for the continuity of a Croatian state in waiting. The keys to this continuity are peasant uprisings, a succession of Croatian kings,⁵⁸ advances in Croatian culture and learning that depict Croatia as a part of a Western European culture that is distinct from the Serbs, and the unbroken reality of Croatian national consciousness that goes back to the seventh century.⁵⁹ What is often ignored by Serbs is that it was the efforts of Croat intellectuals and church leaders in the nineteenth century that first broached the idea of a single South Slav state.⁶⁰

Croatian identity is also tied to the Catholic church and its role in resisting Serbian dominance in the interwar period. The issue of Serbian dominance is hotly debated between Serbs and Croats. While Croats refer to Serbian dominance,⁶¹ Serbs refer to Croat obstructionism.⁶² The debate has no resolution, but by 1938 Cro-

atia did win considerable autonomy from Belgrade and was, effectively, a state within a state.

Another part of the Croatian primordialization project is to address the events of World War II by minimizing the Ustasha aspect and emphasizing the role of the Croats in the partisan resistance led by Tito.⁶³ This interpretation, however, is also open for debate between Croats and Serbs, since most sources that address Tito's partisan movement make it clear that an overwhelming majority of the partisans were Serbs, and that many Croats did not join until Tito, a Croat, offered a pardon at the end of 1943 to anyone who joined the partisans,⁶⁴ although Tito's action did alienate many Serb partisans. It should also be noted that many Serb renegade units participated in revenge massacres against Croatian and Muslim civilians toward the end of World War II. These killings numbered in the thousands and are remembered by Croats and Muslims who insist that the slaughter was mutual and that the world has tended to ignore Croatian and Muslim victims of World War II.

Croatian identity is also reinforced by the failure of the Croatian Republic to separate from Yugoslavia during what is called the Croatian Crises or Croatian Spring of 1968–72. The crises started out as an attempt to liberalize the economic and political system. But the movement was eventually taken over by nationalist elements who pushed for Croatian independence. An alarmed Tito brutally ended the movement and purged the Croatian party of liberals. He then did the same thing to the Serbian party to effect some semblance of ethnic symmetry.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, many of the liberals who were purged in both the Serbian and Croatian Communist parties were the type of leaders who might have been effective in heading off the level of conflict in the Yugoslav conflict of 1991–95. But it is from the experience of 1968–72 that many Croats today stereotype Serbs as conservative Communists while Croats see themselves as liberal democrats in the Western tradition. It was also during the period of the Croatian Crises that Franjo Tudjman became a staunch nationalist who started to write revisionist tracts about what he labeled the myth of the number of Serbian deaths in World War II.⁶⁶

The next element in the continual primordialization of Croatian identity will become the successful secession from Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatian suffering at the hands of the Serbs,

and the German-led recognition by the world community. Pronouncements from Zagreb seem to support this view, although it is still too early for any complete evaluation.

Until the Bosnian war and the siege of Sarajevo began in 1992, Bosnian Muslim identity was essentially a tug of war between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim interpretations of history. The Serb perspective is that the Muslims are Islamicized Slavs who were mostly Serbs. The Croat view is that these same Slavs were Catholic Croats. Some Bosnian Muslims, however, claim that they are descended from the Bogomils, who were a heretic Manichean sect.⁶⁷ Moreover, many Muslim intellectuals during the nineteenth century started to claim that the Bogomils were really Turks from Anatolia and that the "only thing Slavic about the Bosnian Muslims is their language, which they absorbed from the indigenous population."⁶⁸ There are also perspectives that contend that the Bogomils were much more than a sect and that contemporary Bosnian Serbs are not really Serbs but an offshoot of the Vlachs, a sheepherding people related to the Rumanians.⁶⁹

Muslim ethnic identity got a boost in 1971 when they were officially declared a nationality by the Tito regime. He thought that this declaration might end the warring claims for Muslim identity by the Serbs and Croats. Tito's rationale was that the creation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a republic at the end of World War II had outlived its usefulness as a buffer between the Croats and the Serbs and that some other policy was necessary.

There are many recent works that present the history of Bosnia as generally one of interethnic harmony and cooperation.⁷⁰ But it is Donia and Fine's thorough research that, despite their contentions, highlights very ancient roots of the conflict in Bosnia.⁷¹ They present a rich chronology of Bosnian life from antiquity to the present tragedy. Their most important contribution is the thorough and impressive debunking of the incessant claims of Croatian and Serbian chauvinists. Serb nationalists produce evidence that most Bosnian Muslims are Orthodox Serbs who were forcibly converted to Islam by the Ottoman Turks, while Croat nationalists argue that Bosnian Muslims are by blood the "truest" and "purest" of Catholic Croats who were led astray by the Turks.

The conversion to Islam in Bosnia was characterized by a very complex process. Bosnian Muslims were once Slavic Christians who were neither Serbs nor Croats but had a distinct

Bosnian identity and belonged to a Bosnian church that ostensibly bowed toward Rome, a fact that Croats seize upon to make their claims. But the rites of this church closely followed the Eastern Orthodox model, which Serbs contend establishes Serbian identity. But what is most evident is that the Bosnian church was never well established, there were few priests, and the Bosnian Slavic peasants maintained only a tenuous tie to Christianity. Thus, with the Ottoman penetration into Bosnia in the fifteenth century, these peasants began a gradual conversion to Islam in a pragmatic decisionmaking process that took between one and two centuries. Moreover, the contention by some modern Bosnian Muslim scholars that Muslim identity was never Christian but instead sprang from the Bogomils, a sect that rejected Christianity and its rituals, is also refuted by evidence that the Bogomils in Bosnia were very few in number and were never influential in the development of Bosnian history.⁷²

Eventually, Muslims adapted to the erosion of Ottoman hegemony, the nineteenth century influence of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Balkan Wars and World War I, the first Yugoslavia in which Serbs predominated, World War II, the Tito period in which the Muslims finally gained official status as a nation in Bosnia, and the final degeneration into civil war. During this period, the Muslims often exhibited a predilection for compromise and pragmatism, especially after the fall of the Ottoman empire, as the Muslims formed political parties and interest groups whose purpose was to tread the narrow balance point between blatant Croat and Serb attempts to capture their loyalty. Throughout the period, the tolerant, cooperative, and multicultural nature of Bosnian society is stressed by Bosnian Muslim nationalists.⁷³ But a closer examination reveals that Bosnian society was somewhat less tolerant and harmonious than some would contend.

The constructionist and instrumentalist perspectives suggest that Croat and Serb ethnic consciousness did not exist in Bosnia prior to the nineteenth century and that the often mentioned notion that the current war is based on "ancient hatreds" is false. But history presents a more complex picture. It is clear that the development of medieval Bosnia did not occur in isolation and was closely connected to events in Serbia and Croatia. Also, the Ottoman millet system identified ethnic groups by religion instead of ethnicity. Consequently, it is often mistakenly assumed that since the Turks used a

non-ethnic marker to identify Croats and Serbs, a pre-nineteenth-century Croat and Bosnian ethnicity did not exist. But Serbian settlers started moving into Bosnia by the early fifteenth century to escape Ottoman expansion into Kosovo, the Serbian heartland. After some initial migration of Croats out of Bosnia, the Franciscan order successfully helped to maintain a Croat presence in the area of western Bosnia known as Hercegovina. Furthermore, the Austrians offered Serbs land to act as a military buffer against the Turks, and by the seventeenth century Serbs occupied the Krajina in Croatia and adjacent areas in Bosnia. Croat and Serb consciousness was well established and was not simply a construction of nineteenth-century nationalism.⁷⁴

In the social system built by the Ottomans, the Muslim converts were landowners and freeholders, and the overwhelming majority of peasants, who were taxed heavily and lived as second-class citizens, were Serbs, along with a number of Croats.⁷⁵ The peasants, especially the Serbs, who lived in this Jim Crow system chafed at the inequities and started to revolt by the nineteenth century. Of particular interest to a contemporary understanding of ethnic frictions is that, as the Ottoman empire eroded and was forced to make concessions to subject populations, it was in Bosnia where the local Muslim landlords were the most reactionary and hostile to any changes that threatened their paramountcy.⁷⁶

If the above-recounted issues are not evidence of "ancient hatreds," then at least there was fertile ground in Bosnia for ancient antagonisms. When it came to manipulating public opinion, Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia are often cited as architects of the war in Bosnia. However, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic should not be left off the hook. His role in the war, his rather radical political views,⁷⁷ and his renegeing on the Lisbon Agreement of 1992 that would have maintained a multiethnic Bosnia need to be examined closely.⁷⁸ Still, it is clear from the evidence that despite the protestations of extremist Serbs and Croats, the reality of a Muslim national identity is undeniable. The notion of a Bosnia in multiethnic harmony before the current struggle is an insupportable myth that could be maintained only by a centralized Communist system. When Tito died and the system collapsed, history started to catch up rather quickly.

It should be apparent that at this point Muslim identity is still in the process of primordial-

ization. The sieges of Sarajevo and Mostar and the killing fields of Srebrenica will be the building blocks as Kosovo was for the Serbs. Instead of historical records and oral history, the Bosnian Muslims will have access to videotapes, and Benedict Anderson's notion of the printing press as a vehicle for the imaging of identity has evolved to NPR and PBS. The Bosnian Muslims are quickly moving from being Yugoslavs to Bosnian Muslims, and women wearing veils have started to appear in

The Serbs have already started to mythicize the expulsion of 250,000 civilians from the Krajina region of Croatia, an expulsion that the United States refrained from labeling "ethnic cleansing."

villages and even on the streets of Sarajevo.⁷⁹ Moreover, the flirtation with Islamic forces from the Middle East, particularly Iran, has been recently documented.⁸⁰

In contrast to Muslim identity, Serbian identity is rooted in a centuries-old primordialization project. Despite Milosevic's manipulation of the Serbian media and elections, the force of elite manipulation in an instrumentalist fashion is not as significant as one would think for Serbian identity today because Milosevic, or any democratic alternative to him, would be constrained by history from stepping too far outside the successful Kosovo-inspired primordialization of identity.⁸¹ There are even arguments that in the case of the Serbs it is the elites who have been shaped by the memories and the myths of the masses.⁸² The Serbs, more than the Croats or Muslims, are shackled by their view of history and may not be able to escape what they see as an apocalyptic destiny, a destiny that unfortunately combines national paranoia with a sense of a messianic mission to defend Christianity from the mounting forces of Islam.

The Croatian model represents an ethnic identity that is still in the process of primordialization, which is committed to reinforce the notion of a thousand-year history. This project is augmented by a heavy dose of instrumentalism as President Tudjman and his supporters on the Right try to hold onto the power and privileges that they enjoyed during the Communist

era. An example of this effort is the release of the new Croatian currency during May 1994. The new currency is called the "Kuna" and refers to a forest marten. The only memory of this currency dates back to the Ustasha regime, and Jews and Serbs in Croatia have protested in vain. Croatian historians, some quite reluctantly, have scrambled to discover or perhaps imagine instances where marten skins have been used in trade within Croatia during the past thousand years. Some isolated instances have been discovered and so the process of primordialization continues.⁸³

Moreover, the Croats, as they did during the 1960s,⁸⁴ have recently declared that Croat is a separate language from Serbian and have introduced numerous words that go back to Slavic anachronisms from the past. Differences in dialect between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian are probably less pronounced, according to most linguists, than between American and British English. But the process of identity differentiation through language policy is in high gear. In reaction, the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims have also jumped on the bandwagon, and perhaps in five hundred years there will be three different languages created from the current Serbo-Croatian.⁸⁵

The Muslims are in some sense the most free to pursue their own vision of an ethnic identity. Without a Kosovo or a thousand-year state to guide them, they are in a Big Bang period of imagining their place in the world. The process of primordialization occurs under the watchful eye of the world, and the instrumental policies of the government in Sarajevo are profoundly tied to this process. Primordialist, constructivist, and instrumentalist categories have collapsed upon each other in Sarajevo, and the Bosnian Muslims have the luxury of picking and choosing, although there is growing evidence that their role as absolute victim is starting to come under question as more recent evidence has started to point toward a more symmetrical structure of suffering in the current conflict.⁸⁶ Choices for the Croats are more limited but still possible.

The Serbs are fanatically committed to a mythic identity that may not allow choices, even if they desire them. Moreover, the Serbs have already started to mythicize the expulsion of 250,000 civilians from the Krajina region of Croatia, an expulsion that the United States refrained from labeling "ethnic cleansing." The Serbs have also started to focus on the slaughter of Serbs in the Srebrenica area⁸⁷ before the

Bosnian Serb army atrocities of July 1995 as new fodder for their continued vision of martyrdom. If the Serbs cannot break out of a primordialization process that has exhausted itself, then the outlook for the Balkans is very bleak indeed, and the post-Dayton events of 1996 may be the harbinger of tragedy when the NATO forces leave Bosnia.

The complexity of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia has illustrated the difficulty of mono-causal analyses. Despite the penchant in postmodern analysis for stressing the decentered person who can change identities like clothing,⁸⁸ ethnonational identity often predisposes people to dispense with rational decision-making and instead embrace a policy of radical ethnic altruism in which lives are sacrificed.⁸⁹ And although the examination of elite behavior is part and parcel of the methodology of social scientists, this methodology falls short when historically rooted conflicts are examined. In the dark street of available data, it is elite behavior that is lit by the lamp at the end of the street. But it is the rest of the street in which the richness and cultural thickness of memory, myth, and shared experience lurks in shadows. The data in these shadows are often difficult to measure empirically. We must, however, seriously consider their validity lest we ignore them at great cost to future peacemaking and conflict resolution.

NOTES

1. See Liam McDowall, "Group Bosnia Refugees Blocked," Associated Press, 3 August 1996.

2. See Ivica Profaca, "Bosnian Factions at Impasse," Associated Press, 5 August 1996.

3. Christine Spolar, "EU Considers Leaving as Croats in Mostar Disregard Deadline," *Washington Post*, 5 August 1996.

4. See Jane Perez, "Divided City's Croats Agree to Honor Vote Results," *New York Times*, 7 August 1996; Christine Spolar, "Bosnians End Dispute Over Divided City," *Washington Post*, 7 August 1996.

5. See John Pomfret, "Bosnian City Bombing Bodes Ill for Elections," *Washington Post*, 28 June 1996. Pomfret also discusses how the EU made election booths available for Mostar's Muslim and Croat refugees throughout Europe and the former Yugoslavia but not for the Serbs. Moreover, Pomfret reveals that the NATO commander in the region arranged for safe bus passage of former Muslim residents who wanted to vote in the Mostar election but refrained from making similar arrangements for Serbs.

6. See Jane Perlez, "Bosnian Serb Chief Agrees to Give Up Power," *New York Times*, 20 July 1996.

7. In the context of ethnic groups that make claims to nationhood and even to states, the terms ethnic group, ethnonational group, and nation are

interchangeable. For an extended and helpful discussion of these terms, see Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a . . ." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (1978): 377-400.

8. Jasmina Kuzmanovic, "Serbs Stoned, Taunted in Bosnia Takeover," Associated Press, 24 February 1996.

9. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

10. See Mike O'Connor, "Bosnian Serbs Are Threatened in Sarajevo," *New York Times*, 6 June 1996.

11. Patrick Moore, "Bosnian Prime Minister Pledges End to Harassment of Serbs," *OMRI*, 26 July 1996.

12. See V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Serbia's Road to War," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

13. Steven Majstorovic, "The Primordialization of Ethnonational Identity in the Former Yugoslavia: A Synthetic Model," Conference paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 14-16 March 1996.

14. See Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 (April 1993): 183-201.

15. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

16. Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology* 7 (1957): 113-45.

17. A spirited response to Eller and Coughlan is presented by Steven Grosby in which he argues for the importance of historical experience in ethnonational memory and for a less simplistic analysis of the work of Geertz and Shils. See Steven Grosby, "The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie of Primordiality—A Response to Eller and Coughlan," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17 (January 1994): 164-70.

18. See R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, *The Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

19. See, for example, Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) and Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holes & Meier Publishers, 1983).

20. See Michael G. Roskin, *The Rebirth of East Europe*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994).

21. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 12-13.

22. See Anthony Smith, "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20 (1991): 353-68.

23. See Anthony Smith, "Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations," *Nations and Nationalism* 1 (March 1995): 3-23.

24. Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 216.

25. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 4.

26. Japan, Iceland, Germany, Slovenia, and now Croatia are exceptions to the general incongruence between the state and nation that is characteristic of the majority of nation-states that are in fact multinational or multiethnic. See Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* 24 (1972): 319-55.

27. See Alex N. Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia: Search For a Viable Political System* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983) and Pedro Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).

28. Describing ethnicity as an independent variable does not imply a simplistic causal assumption. It is clear that no sociopolitical variables are completely independent or dependent. It argued here, however, that the force of ethnicity is powerful enough to shape political outcomes in a manner that is largely independent of class structures. See Steven Majstorovic, "Politicized Ethnicity and Economic Inequality: A Subjective Perspective and a Cross-National Examination," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1 (Spring 1995): 33-53.

29. For representative examples of Connor's important insights, see Walker Connor, "Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7 (1984): 342-59; Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?"; Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a . . ."; and Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism" in *Understanding Political Development*, Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 196-220.

30. Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 204-05.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

32. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 8-9.

33. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 102.

34. See Anya Peterson Royce, "Neither Christian nor Jewish," in *Ethnic Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 17-33.

35. See E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

36. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed. (Verso: New Left Books, 1991).

37. Edward Shils, "Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society," *Nations and Nationalism* 1 (1995): 93-118.

38. I have to thank Rick Coughlin of Drury College for inspiring this terminology during the course of an NEH-sponsored seminar on cultural pluralism at the University of Wisconsin Madison, July 1994. For him this might have been a throwaway comment but to me it seemed like a mini-Rosetta Stone.

39. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, 8.

40. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), 8.

41. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, 6.

42. *Ibid.*, 8.

43. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Pol-*

itics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus: Merrill, 1972).

44. Instead of collapsing primordialism and constructivism into one category—primordialization—as I have above, others have combined instrumentalism and constructivism. See for example, Hudson Meadwell, "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 12 (1989): 309-27; and Ernst B. Haas, "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22 (1993): 505-45.

45. The obvious objection to this depiction of a complex relationship is that it is tautological since there must be some independent variable out there somewhere that can drive the relationships through history. I would suggest that this type of objection, although well grounded from a particular epistemological perspective, needs to consider the inherent voluntarism and self-consciousness involved in ethnopolitics and ethnic identity. And, consciousness itself has yet to be reduced to objective categories and its subjective nature lends itself easily to models that may seem tautological from certain perspectives.

46. See for example, Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) and Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

47. In Serbo-Croatian the word *yug* means south. Thus, Yugoslavia was the land of the Southern Slavs.

48. 28 June (15 June in the Eastern Orthodox calendar) is a critical day in Serbian mythology. This day, called Vidovdan for St. Vitus day, commemorates the Battle of Kosovo, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb (Gavrilo Princip) in 1914, and the date of the first Yugoslav Constitution in 1921. Along with Christmas, Easter, and the Serbian family saint day (Slava), it is considered the holiest of days.

49. See Nicholas C. J. Pappas and Lee Brigance Pappas, "The Ottoman View of the Battle Kosovo," in Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas A. Emmert, eds. *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 41-60.

50. *Ibid.*, 53.

51. See Dragnich and Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo*.

52. When Serbian soldiers returned to the Field of Blackbirds in the winter of 1912 they crept over the field barefoot so as not to disturb the fallen warriors from the 1389 battle. Certainly, this is an instance where historical memory seemed to reach mythic dimensions.

53. Thomas Emmert, "The Battle of Kosovo: Early Reports of Victory and Defeat," in Pappas and Pappas, *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*.

54. While doing research in the former Yugoslavia, I happened to be in Belgrade during the summer of 1990. The street scene was filled with peddlers of all sorts of merchandise, musicians, and acres of food stands. At some point, it seemed as if the whole city started to converge on a spot where an ancient fellow was playing the *guslo* (a one-stringed instrument made out of a gourd and stretched goat skin). This *guslar* was singing the "Kosovo Cycle." Its telling took about two hours and no one left. The

crowd continued to grow and Belgrade came to a halt. I knew then that a war was certainly brewing.

55. Alex N. Dragnich, *Serb and Croats* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1992).

56. Michael Lees, *The Rape of Serbia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992); David Martin, *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990); and David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 9. Owen notes that Mihailovich was exonerated of collaboration charges leveled at him by Tito in a 1946 show trial after which Mihailovich was executed despite protests throughout the world. An American investigation during the Truman administration completely exonerated Mihailovich and he was posthumously awarded the Legion of Merit in 1948, America's highest honor for a foreigner. The award notes Mihailovich's substantial contributions to the Allied cause and the rescue of over five hundred American pilots by the Mihailovich forces. The award was kept secret, however, until after Tito's death to ensure stable relations with Yugoslavia during the cold war.

57. The number of Serbians killed is an item of considerable interest to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims alike. Serbian church officials insist that more than a million Serb civilians (1.2 million) were slaughtered. Current Croatian President Tudjman contends that the number is closer to 60,000; see Franjo Tudjman, *Wastelands—Historical Reality* (Zagreb: Matice Hrvatske, 1989). Tudjman also presents arguments that less than a million people died in the Holocaust in all of Europe. Most independent sources place the number of Serbian civilian victims at between 500,000 to 850,000. The findings of the Nuremberg Commission and of the Simon Wiesenthal Center place their estimates at 750,000. See Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Constantin Fotić, *The War We Lost: Yugoslavia's Tragedy and the Failure of the West* (New York: The Viking Press, 1948); and Lazo Kostich, *Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia* (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1981). Kostich uses strictly German and Italian military archives to present a disturbing account of the events.

58. See Knezevic, Anthony, *A Short History of the Croatian Nation* (Philadelphia: Croatian Catholic Union, 1983).

59. Ivo Banac's beautifully written and painstakingly cited volume on Yugoslavia, *The National Question*, makes a strong case for an unbroken Croatian consciousness and state for at least a 1,000 years. However, Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, 76-77, takes issue with Banac and claims that although Serbs can make the claim for an unbroken history of national consciousness since medieval times, Croatian consciousness can be traced only to the nineteenth century, and chides Banac for his "Failure to allow for this adequately [which] makes [an] otherwise excellent discussion less than persuasive on the Croatian aspect," fn 53, 76. Hobsbawm then goes on to suggest that "mass Croatian consciousness appears to have developed only after the establishment of Yugoslavia, and against the new kingdom, or more precisely the alleged Serb predominance within it," 135. Hobsbawm's critique, however, is applicable only from

the perspective of the development of modern nationalism. The historical record is clear that Croatian ethnic consciousness certainly predates the nineteenth century.

60. Branka Prpa-Jovanovic, "The Making of Yugoslavia (1830-1945)," in Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway, eds., *Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare* (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995).

61. See Banac, *The National Question*.

62. See Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia*.

63. See Branka Magas, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia* (London: Verso, 1993).

64. Pedor Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 145.

65. See Dennison I. Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia Part I," and "Crisis in Croatia Part II," *American Universities Field Staff: Southeast Europe Series*, 19, 4-20 (Part I), 1-17 (Part II); and Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 104-43.

66. See Richard West, *Tito: And The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (New York: Carrol and Graf, 1994), 300-01.

67. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 156.

68. *Ibid.*, 146. During my research in Yugoslavia in 1990, I encountered quite a few Bosnian Muslims, particularly professionals and political elites, who claimed that they are ethnically Turks and not descended from Slavs.

69. See Noel Malcom, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 70-81.

70. See Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (London: Hurst and Company, 1994); Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Noel Malcom, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994); and Mark Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

71. Although non-native Balkan scholars tend to be less biased than native scholars, it is often the case that researchers tend to drift toward a Serb, a Croat, or a Muslim perspective. The works cited above (note 70) are all somewhat Muslimcentric, although Donia and Fine are by far the least biased.

72. Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina*, 13-70.

73. *Ibid.*, 75-135; Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims*, 57-116.

74. See Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina*, 13-75.

75. *Ibid.*, 78.

76. *Ibid.*, 78-119; Friedman, *The Muslims of Bosnia*, 61-80.

77. See Alija Izetbegovic, *Islamic Declaration*, 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Mala Muslimanska Biblioteka, 1990). In his book Izetbegovic scathingly attacks Kemal Ataturk's secular reforms in Turkey in the early part of the twentieth century and holds up Pakistan as a societal model to be followed. Izetbegovic's party has also come under criticism for its repression of political opposition. See Mike O'Connor, "The Opposition In Bosnia Faces Terror Tactics," *New York Times*, 17 August 1996.

78. Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 196.

79. NPR report, 1 July 1994.

80. See Chris Hedges, "Bosnians Sending Soldiers to Iran for Infantry Training," *New York Times*, 3 March 1996; Laurent Rebour, "NATO Seizes Bosnia Terrorist Training Site," Associated Press, 17 February 1996; and Kit B. Roane, "NATO Accuses Sarajevo of Link to Terror Training," *New York Times*, 17 February 1996.

81. When Milan Panic, a U.S. citizen and millionaire businessman, was brought to Yugoslavia and coopted to be vice president by the Milosevic regime, he quickly made a critical error which may have cost him the election when he opposed Milosevic in national elections; see Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 213-14. Panic, who was a product of the communist system before he emigrated to the United States, suggested to the Serbs that compromise on Kosovo was necessary and the Serbian focus on this issue was excessive. After this suggestion, his stock in Serbia, and even among American Serbs who overwhelmingly detest the Milosevic regime, quickly faded. Only support by other Serbian opposition groups created enough of a mobilized electorate to get Panic around 40 percent of the vote.

82. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Nationalism and the 'Idiocy' of the Countryside: The Case of Serbia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1996): 19, 70-87.

83. Roger Cohen, "Croatia Currency's Name Protested," *The New York Times*, 26 May 1994.

84. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 107-09.

85. See Chris Hedges, "In the Balkans, Three Languages Now Fight It Out," *New York Times*, 15 May 1996; and Chuck Sudetic, "Balkan Conflicts Are Uncoupling Serbo-Croatian," *New York Times*, 26 December 1993.

86. See Peter Brock, "Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press," *Foreign Policy* 93 (Winter 1993-94): 152-72; George Kenney, "Steering Clear of Balkan Shoals," *The Nation* 262 (8/15 January 1996): 21-24;

and George Kenney, "The Bosnia Calculation: How Many Have Died? Not nearly as many as some would have you think," *New York Times Magazine*, 23 April 1995. Kenney resigned from the U.S. State Department in 1992 in protest over U.S. policy in Bosnia. Since then he has augmented his views and now sees the conflict in terms that are almost as critical of the Croats and Muslims as they are of the Serbs.

87. See David Rhode, interviewed by Charlene Hunter-Gault on the *PBS News Hour With Jim Lehrer*, 17 November 1995. Under pressure from Gault, Rhode admitted that the Muslims used the safe haven of Srebrenica to launch attacks against Serb villages. In these attacks, the Muslims took videos of the beheading of Serb civilians, women and children included, and then showed them in the cafes of Srebrenica. These videos were shown to shocked Western reporters at the time. The Muslim leader responsible for these acts, Nasir Oric, is now in Tuzla, Bosnia, and is yet to be indicted by the Hague. This only reinforces the contentions of Serbs about the double standard of justice in Bosnia. Of course, Rhode did mention that despite Muslim atrocities around Srebrenica, the massive Serb response had no justification. To further complicate matters, the Bosnian parliamentary member for Srebrenica, Ibran Mustafic, accused the Bosnian government of ordering attacks against Serbs within the UN safe area so any Serb response would lead the Muslims "into a catastrophe." See Dario Sito Susic, "Bosnian Government, Srebrenica Survivors Divided Over Fall of Town," *OMRI Reports*, Prague, 15 July 1996.

88. See Dorinne K. Kondo, *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).

89. See Paul C. Stern, "Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?" *Political Psychology* 16 (June 1995): 217-35.