Among Schelling's most important contributions was his formulation of a sophisticated theory of the unconscious. In the next twenty-five minutes, I shall attempt to show how the notion of a pre-rational genesis of unconscious motivations led Schelling to his conception of a primordial, irrational power deep within the human psyche. This seminal idea was later to have important consequences for twentieth-century ideas about the nature of religious psychology - consequences which continue to have repercussions up to the present day.

The Theory of Potencies

Starting around 1813, with the publication of a speculative cosmology entitled The Ages of the World, Schelling sought to explain the genesis and changing historical forms of religion in terms of a complex theory involving three dynamic psycho-spiritual powers, or "Potencies." These Potencies, which he claims unfold according to principles of dialectical self-reproduction, are animate powers inhabiting the unconscious strata of a people's collective mind. Time does not permit me to explain in detail how Schelling arrived at his doctrine of the Potencies, but it will be helpful to sketch out for you the main delineation of his theory. I shall first do so in abstract, general terms, and then briefly show how this theory cashes out in the interpretation of mythological systems.

The Pure Potencies Prior to their Actualization

To begin with, Schelling conceives of an era prior to the beginning of worldly time, during which the generative Potencies would have subsisted in a state of quiescence. During this primordial, first "time" within eternity (or "proto-time," as we might rather say, in order to distinguish it from worldly time) motion and change would not yet have existed, for there would have been no physical matter or energy present to serve as the bearers of change. Instead, there would only have been the pure dialectical relations of the Potencies in their original condition, a condition marked by total harmony and a mutual codetermination by each of the others' essential natures.

In their state of quiescence, as they were before the creation of any concrete existence, the three Potencies would be defined as follows:

(a) The first Potency, which Schelling symbolizes as A1, is the sheer, unlimited possibility of being. This is not to be understood in the abstract sense of bare logical possibilities, however. Rather, Schelling is thinking primarily in terms of what is volitionally possible.(1) Volitional possibility is that which a being might conceivably entertain as desirable for itself; and a volitionally possible state of affairs is any condition of being, distribution of resources, allocation of pleasure or pain etc., which some agent (or derivatively, some collectivity of agents) might aspire toward as a worthwhile goal. (The point here is to emphasize the role of the will as a determinator of possible realities based more on their perceived values for individuals than on their abstract structural characteristics in general.)

However, the pure principle of possibility by itself is proto-temporally indeterminate: As including all possible forms of being, it discriminates among none, so that the ephemeral is equally represented along with the durable, the contingent along with the necessary. The first Potency is thus wholly unlimited and indefinite. As such, it is devoid of objective being, since objectivity requires definite structure.

(b) The second Potency, symbolized as A2, provides the principle of order. This is the source of objectivity, whose role it is to impart determinate structure to the limitless possibility of A1, and in that way to make possible a concrete world. Basically, A2 is the principle of specification, whereby a limited subset of all possible predicates is assigned to each particular thing. The definiteness and fixity of A2 contrasts with the indefiniteness and fluidity of A1 in approximately the same way that, in grammar, the indicative mood contrasts with the subjunctive: The first Potency (subjunctive mood: A1) pictures what might have been; while the second (indicative mood: A2) represents what is. Both principles are equally indispensable components of the world. (And yet, be it carefully noted, both are so far still only in the mode of possibilities.)

The second Potency accordingly constitutes the "pure act" which serves as the "formal cause," in Aristotle's sense, over-against the "material cause" which is the first Potency.(2) This "pure act" or "pure being" functions as the container bounding A1, the matrix of volitional possibilities.

(c) Each of the first two Potencies, A1 and A2, is incomplete by itself in that it requires the cooperative influence of the other in order to be what it is. A2, as the objective moment, depends upon A1 as the subjective moment, because no object can be in isolation, but only insofar as it stands in relation to, and is experienced by, consciousness. On the other hand, A1 is equally dependent upon A2, the principle of determinate being, because no subject can be, except insofar as it has an object. Thus, each moment presupposes its other.(3) This results in a dialectical dilemma, which must be resolved if any world is to be possible even in principle. The dialectical need for a more adequate principle of being therefore produces the third Potency, symbolized as A3.

The third Potency is the ideal fulfillment and balance of the first two Potencies. It is the mediating interface between subjectivity and objectivity, which rises above both the other two. Like A1, it represents the totality of possibilities, but without being for that reason indefinite. At the same time, like A2, it accommodates the determinate, but without losing its inner spontaneity. In other words, whereas A1 is the Unlimited and A2 is the Limiting, A3 is the purely Self-Limiting, and this constitutes its completion.(4) Consequently, A3 is the highest of the three Potencies. It is here that the dialectic of ontological principles reaches its highest realization in principle.

The Inverted Potencies in their State of Tension

Although the Potencies as just described make up a highly complex and internally coherent system, and although its laws constitute an indispensable constituent of reality, it is not yet real, according to Schelling, because it lacks the specificity of concrete presence and individuality. Pure essences in themselves are sterile, defining no more than the general natures of things. Schelling maintains that these essences, by virtue of their very generality, are lacking in full actuality. For example, the essence of the Deity would remain the same, regardless of whether any actual Deity exists. And the same stricture applies to all essences as such. To this extent, therefore, the world of essences, as determined by the three Potencies, is still only hypothetical.(5)

Real existence, then, requires something more than formal essences. But this cannot be solved simply by invoking some quality or characteristic inherent in the essences of things which would supposedly guarantee their actuality. That line of reasoning was the core of the so-called "Ontological Proof" of God's existence, and Schelling was determined not to repeat what he regarded as a deep conceptual blunder. But how else is one to understand the transition from ideal being to actual existence, from formal laws to concrete facts? How, above all, is one to explain the sheer existence of particular entities as particulars?

By way of providing an answer, Schelling turns again to the first Potency, A1, which represents the indeterminate totality of possibilities. As we have seen, ideally A1 should subordinate itself to A2, accepting the structural limitations that determinate being necessarily involves. According to Schelling, this means that A1 ought to remain in a position of "relative not-being" - i.e., to keep its nature within bounds so as to provide the enabling foundation (Grund) for the other two Potencies to be.(6) Yet precisely because of A1's capacity as the wellspring of all possibilities, it also possesses the ability to cease subordinating itself in the proper way. Instead, it can oppose the harmoniously rational order. Just as its original submission to the two higher Potencies has always been unconstrained and uncoerced, by the same token it is at liberty to abandon this condition. In exercising that option, however, the first Potency would thereby be expropriating for itself the preeminent position in the world system, which by rights should pertain to the third Potency.(7)

The next move in Schelling's argument is quite difficult to grasp. In order to understand it, one must bear two things in mind: first, that the new mode of being which A1 is to receive will be completely alien to that Potency's original nature; and second, that this alien type of being will be the antithesis to everything that is universal, everything that is ideal. Why should this be so? Again, the reason is that the pure relationships represented by the pre-mundane Potencies in their initial state of rest were no more than ideal possibilities. Concrete existence, however, would still be unaccounted for, since (as we have seen) existence requires something more than the bare descriptive predicates that ideal essences provide. Hence, the brute facticity of existence must be the opposite of an idea, the precise contrary of an essence. The concrete basis of existence must escape the formal structures of intelligibility altogether: It will therefore be the ultimate surd.

Now insofar as the new mode of being would be of an alien type, the first Potency would be forced to undergo a profound alteration. This change would involve a dislocation of its previously self-contained character, so that presently it would seem, as it were, to be turned inside out. (Schelling observes that the word "exist" derives from the Greek "existamenon," which literally means "standing outside itself."(8)) The result would be a total disruption of A1, transforming it into something non-conscious and in disequilibrium with its own, implicit essence. As a result of this radical transformation, A1 would enter into a condition of profound confusion and disorder. According to Schelling, what was once an inchoate plenum of possibilities would suddenly become a chaotic field of conflicts, no longer receptive to the ordering influence of A2, but positively resistive to determination in any form.

In effect, the first Potency would now behave in exactly the opposite manner from formerly. Schelling accordingly symbolizes it with a new designation, as "B."(9) Schelling's main point throughout this argument is to emphasize that real existence begins in chaos. Such a beginning is necessary, thinks Schelling, because the extra-ideal and irrational type of being which is the source of concrete existence must, initially at least, make a sharp break away from the harmonious system of pure possibilities that previously prevailed. Furthermore, Schelling insists that this principle of chaos cannot merely be passively indeterminate, but must be actively antithetical to differentiated being.

Because of B's intractably monolithic, even destructive character, it would clearly be inimical to the teleological purpose of creating a rationally articulated, harmonious universe. Assuming that there is a God, therefore, B would be a principle fundamentally opposed to the divine Providence. It would assume the aspect of "that-which-ought-not-to-be" (das nicht-sein-Sollende).(10) In this capacity, then, B would take on the role of the cosmic Antagonist, the dark Other which needs to be subdued. (The alert reader will immediately note what applications this idea will have in the interpretations of myths.)

Simultaneously with the inversion of the first Potency, the other two Potencies have also undergone a corresponding transformation. The second Potency, A2, now excluded from its proper position in relation to the first Potency, is forced to assume a subordinate position. To that extent it finds itself in the position of a relative not-being. Yet precisely in provisionally being pressed back to this position of an unrealized potential, A2 acquires an overriding purpose, which is the drive to push B back to its proper, subordinate position as A1.(11) The struggle to return these Potencies to their proper relations in the ideal world defines the entire dynamic of concrete existence.

The third Potency does not experience a change of character in quite the same sense as the other two: As the ideal balance and synthesis of both the subjective and objective poles, A3 is not susceptible to any distortions of that kind. Nevertheless, since the realization of A3 presupposes a prior attainment of the proper relationships among A1 and A2, the third Potency cannot emerge in its full actuality until the other two Potencies have successfully completed their development. Consequently, A3 in its state of tension no longer appears as the eternal harmony of the Unlimited and the Limiting (although on the ideal level it remains that, too); but instead it assumes the form of a future condition that will only then fully supervene when the struggle of the world process has finally achieved completion. Until that culminating point has been reached, A3 hovers on the horizon as the final cause toward which the entire course of history is evolving.(12)

Applications to Mythology

Our investigation now turns to a discussion of Schelling's interpretations of some specific mythical themes. The ontological principles developed in the negative philosophy, and the Potenzenlehre in particular, provide the theoretical framework upon which the empirical data can be arranged. In order to grasp the essentials of Schelling's system of mythology, one must focus on the recurrent themes which, according to him, appear in virtually all religions.

Basically, Schelling interprets mythology in terms of three primary deities, whose changing interrelationships and corresponding degrees of activity or passivity constitute the various different levels of development in world religions. These three deities are none other than the three inverted Potencies themselves: god B, god A2, and god A3. The critical analysis of their respective roles and interactions will accordingly make up the backbone of Schelling's interpretation of mythology.

Although these gods have received many diverse names and forms in different cultures, Schelling insists that their identities are fundamentally the same. Consequently, he does not regard it as necessary to conform to the indigenous names for the gods as used in each separate culture, but instead he tends to use identical, mainly Greek, names throughout his analyses. This hermeneutical strategy certainly does facilitate comparisons of the different mythical systems concerned, although the legitimacy of the strategy certainly does need some justification.

Schelling points back to the arguments elaborated in his exposition of the Potenzenlehre. If it is true, as he contends, that prior to the emergence of any specific multiplicities there had to be some more basic principles - or meta-principles - on which all derivative entities and thought-forms must depend, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that these must have been the principle of undifferentiated unity, the principle of general differentiation, and the principle of differentiated unity. Out of the interaction of these three Potencies, Schelling theorizes, the whole integrated system of nature and mind has been constituted.

The Religion of Undifferentiated Pantheism ("Relative Monotheism")

Schelling anticipates C.G. Jung in suggesting that what conferred on the ancient gods their irresistible power and objective reality was precisely their origination in the depths of the unconscious, whose intuitive activities long preceded the reasoning and categorizing functions of the mind. This is what is genuinely novel in his hermeneutical approach. According to his analysis, myths could not have been the voluntary products of either fantasy, intellect, or any other partial aspect of subjective consciousness. They were not half-understood representations (as Friedrich Creuzer and others maintained) of concepts whose origins in conscious experience had been lost or whose meanings had been obscured. Rather, the true genesis of myths predated explicitly "conscious" experience and in fact decisively molded it. The originative impulses that issued in the worship of ancient gods were inextricably interwoven with the inmost nature of the human psyche, as inseparable from it as language itself.(13)

In the first book of his Philosophie der Mythologie, Schelling sets out to examine the original condition of humankind prior to its division into distinct races, peoples, and nations. According to the theory just cited, there must have existed a pre-historical epoch that was dominated by the first primal Potency. The first Potency, in its inverted form as B, was essentially the principle of bare existence. As such, Schelling designates this Potency as "the real god."(14) This, Schelling declared, was "the inward-drawing, consuming power" (die zusammenziehende Kraft), a monolithically chaotic principle whose primary effect was to fuse the phenomena of experience into a relatively undifferentiated whole.

According to the principles of the religious dialectic, this meant that the emergence of polytheistic religions, with all their intricate allocations of spiritual functions and spheres of influence, could only have made an appearance relatively late in the life of humanity. Prior to that, extending far back into pre-historical time, there must have been a religion of uniform pantheism, untouched by any differentiated specifications into diverse principles or powers. This was the age of the "primordial consciousness" (Urbewußtsein) for which the awareness of temporality and historicity themselves did not yet exist. The tonic chord (Grundton) of religious consciousness, he maintains, always has presupposed this sense of an underlying unity.(15) During the First World Age of humankind, this tonic chord of unity must have been so dominant as to have completely filled and overwhelmed consciousness. Schelling explains why in the following terms:

It was a spiritual power that accomplished this. For the condition of remaining one, the non-differentiating phase of humanity requires for its explanation a positive cause, no less than the subsequent differentiation does. . . . But if we ask, what spiritual power alone was strong enough to hold humanity in this immobility, it can immediately be seen that it was one principle, and indeed it must have been One principle by which the consciousness of people was exclusively dominated and controlled. For as soon as two principles would divide the hegemony, differences would have to arise within humanity also, as the latter would inevitably divide itself between the two principles. But further, such a principle as gave room to no other within consciousness, permitting none beyond itself, could only have been that of an infinite being, only a god; a god who completely filled consciousness, who was common to all humanity; a god who drew this humanity, so to say, into his own unity, denying it any movement, any straying from the path at all, whether to the right or to the left, as the Old Testament often expresses it; only such a principle could bring about a duration (Dauer) for that absolute immobility, that standstill for all development.(16)

Because both these aspects of pantheism and "naturalism" corresponded to the as yet undeveloped self-consciousness of early humanity, and because the principle of their faith sprang from the deification of a "blind impulse" (ein blindes . . . Wollen), which did not include the notion of any purposeful deliberation or will (Wille), the first religion tended to emphasize feelings of fatalistic necessity in the worshipper and precluded any sense of personal freedom or individuality.(17) Schelling maintains that the effect of god B's power was to prevent the development of differentiated social forms and to fuse the mass of humanity into a culturally homogeneous whole. Complex divisions of labor, as well as the divisions among national groups, such as would later characterize agricultural civilizations, were as yet unknown. The people of this era comprised a single, if relatively simple, world. Schelling believes they must have lived primarily as nomadic herders, mingling easily with one another and undistinguished by racial or ethnic differences.(18)

A Revolution in Religion: Deities of Differentiation and Order

With the dawning of historical times, according to Schelling, the previously homogeneous human species began to separate into distinct races and peoples. Thought also became differentiated with the emergence of logical abstractions and categories of being. The cause of this occurrence, he says, was the "Great Spiritual Crisis," which suddenly irrupted into human consciousness. Basically, this was the advent of the god of the second Potency, A2, the harbinger of the Second World Age.(19) Simultaneously with these developments (and not accidentally so), the religion of universal pantheism underwent a gradual divergence into different forms and teachings.

This transition occurred, according to Schelling, on two levels within the religious consciousness of early humanity - each contending with the other for recognition and dominance. On the one hand, there was the simple representation of a deity in his/her primordial unity, prior to any awareness of oppositions or conflicts. On the other hand, there was also an intuition that this condition of innocent contentment could not last forever, that a departure or Fall from the bower of vernal purity was inevitable. The uneasy ambivalence brought about by this realization signaled, on Schelling's interpretation, that the Second World Age of mythological development was about to begin. The religion of relative monotheism was dialectically determined to flower into full-fledged polytheism. Before that could happen, however, the darker aspect of god B would rouse itself for a final stand against the coming encroachments of the new gods. Because of god B's emerging character of stubborn resistance to change and development, Schelling identifies him with the Greek god, Cronus (although he also intends this deity to have cross-cultural resonances with many other cultures and traditions).

In order for religious development to advance, thinks Schelling, it was necessary for the god of relative monotheism to make room for, and eventually to be subordinated to, a higher principle. In effect, this meant that god B would have to cede the place at the "Center" of the religious universe and assume a less important, less dominant role at the periphery. The changes needed in religious consciousness could not help but be traumatic. The transferral of allegiances would be all the more difficult in that it required people to shift their innate sense of identity and reevaluate the relations of self and others. This was so for at least two basic reasons: (i) Because the first Potency, in its capacity as the original principle of subjectivity, was also the prototype of selfhood and egoity, the subordination of that principle would necessarily have to involve, by association, a conquest of the worshipper's own sense of self. In effect, humanity would have to sacrifice the inflexible spirit of selfhood by which until now it had been enthralled. (ii) Furthermore, insofar as god B represented the first Potency's inverted mode as the chaotic substrate of natural being, the primal religion had been fixated on the immediate fact - the miracle - of existence. To throw into question this pure adulation of existence could not help but seem to the primitive imagination as a threat to the bedrock of the universe and even of human life itself.

For both these reasons, then, the hegemony of god B was a dangerous thing to question. As the exclusive, "inward-drawing power," this Potency had already appropriated the Center of concrete reality to itself. Any attempt to liberate the world from the totalitarian grip of this power would accordingly be experienced by early human beings as a denigration of the deity's rightful supremacy. This prospect was enough to arouse very uneasy feelings. But what seemed to the religious mind of that era as blasphemy and godlessness was in fact, according to Schelling, a necessary "peripheralization" of the first Potency. God B would eventually have to yield the spiritual Center of the universe in order to make way for the arrival of a more complex and spiritual deity.(20)

The processes of rationalization and self-subordination, however, would require thousands of years during the pre-historic period as the religious mind struggled to realize its true destiny. Very dimly and tentatively, the second Potency, god A2, began to make its influence felt.

Unlike the monolithic "real god," Cronus, who was indifferent to organized structures and valued only bare existence, the new god (identified with Dionysus, but again in a cross-cultural significance) appeared as the "relatively spiritual god . . . lord and friend of all that was human . . . creator of genuinely human life, gracious to the individual and to humanity."(21) As the bringer of sophisticated agricultural methods, indicated by his traditional association with the grape, Dionysus was simultaneously the originator of urban life and the founder of civilization.(22) In general, as the source of an unconfined multiplicity, in contrast to the previously stifling conditions of existential uniformity, he was the "liberating god," who first introduced humanity to the possibilities of a higher spiritual life.(23) In different cultures he was variously worshipped as Melkart, Orotal, Axiokersos, Osiris, Shiva, Prometheus, or Herakles; but these differences in nomenclature hardly matter to Schelling. Hence, the philosopher generally uses one Greek name, "Dionysus," to refer to all the embodiments of the new god. Furthermore, he finds that every complete mythological tradition has preserved in connection with this deity the same basic motifs:

Initially, A2 appeared as the Nameless God. According to Schelling, this condition was symptomatic of a general uneasiness occasioned by the barely perceptible stirrings of the coming revolution. Still locked in the "compact" world view associated with their originally nomadic way of life, people were apprehensive about the implications of spiritual differentiation and personal individuation: What would be the expected consequence, for example, if the divine attribute of goodness were to be distinguished from that of power, if the nurturing spirit of fecundity were separated from that of creative inventiveness, or if the custody of the dead were divided from the care of the living? Similarly, what would happen if the rights and responsibilities of a celibate priestess were to be detached from those of a wife and mother, or if the duties of a soldier were sharply differentiated from those of a farmer? Surely disaster would follow, as the previously unified domain of god B disintegrated into a multiplicity of discrete functions. Faced with this prospect, early humanity experienced sorrow and dread.(24) Basically, consciousness was not yet ready to assimilate the notion of an informing spirit as opposed to that of formless being.

Nevertheless, a vague dissatisfaction set in with the blind religion of merely worshipping the ground of existence. People increasingly desired to acknowledge, somehow, the multiplicities of structure, the logical interrelations and articulations among all the differentia of things, the great wonder of being able to control these various differentia. But this would require recognizing the rational spirit in its role as subordinator of material being, mind as the harbinger of civilization. At first this idea was still too difficult to bear. The religious mind clung to the miracle of being and turned apprehensively away from the miracle of intelligibility. Yet in the end, this crucial dialectical move was inevitable, according to Schelling: "The entire process that follows," he claims, "thus involves for the blind principle, B, a transition from blindness and unintelligence to understanding."(25)

Ironically, even as it turned at first away from god A2, the religious consciousness implicitly was induced to recognize its reality. For in order to reject the claims of the formal intelligence, in order to repudiate the worth of a precisely articulated world view, it was first necessary to admit that these allegedly false values did at least have some purchase on being. Thus, the mythological consciousness was forced to acknowledge the existence of A2, even while steadfastly rejecting its claims to divinity.(26) For this reason, the revised strategy of the inverted first Potency could no longer simply be to ignore the approaching second Potency. Instead, the goal was to oppose and, if possible, to destroy the antagonist.

These hostile feelings could not, of course, be assuaged directly, since there was no way in which halt the inexorable progress of the second Potency itself. Yet the old religion of primordial Being continued to nourish aggressive feelings toward the new religion of differentiated culture, and it sought to experience at least a vicarious vengeance by means of ritually slaughtering the symbolic representatives of the divine enemy.

For anxiously, jealously, yes with deadly weapons does consciousness protect the treasure immersed in being, and it also fills with terror the sensibility that is on the verge of opening up to the liberating god; in such a way, that the first intimation of freedom from the oppressive real god, this first transformation, I say, consciousness experiences as guilt calling for blood. Therefore the first bloody expiatory offerings fall here. Yes, to this god who consumes like fire everything that threatens his uniqueness, . . . to him first the free human being falls as a sacrifice, as if to rebuff that milder god who is a friend to humankind, and as a bloody expiation for the guilt which the human assumed in allowing place for the other god.(27)

Accordingly, just as the primordial religious consciousness was engaged in a struggle against a perceived interloper, so it now represented its god as seeking to retain the hegemony by blocking the path of his potential successor. It was for this reason that the approaching A2 was so often represented in mythology as only a demigod, born of a mortal woman, and as having to endure the most difficult and at times horrible ordeals. This requirement reflected an implicit accommodation of the new world spirit to the obsessive compulsions of the old. In Phoenician mythology, for example, this conflict was represented by the struggle between El and Melkart; in Egypt by the blood-feud between Set and Osiris; in Greece by the antagonism between Dionysus (and his feminine counterpart, Demeter) and the gods of the underworld (represented collectively as "Cronus"); and even in Hebrew myth by the tension between Elohim and Isaac.(28) In all these instances, a "jealous god" was pictured as seeking to retain hegemony by demanding the sacrifice of a perceived rival or interloper.

At this point, however, a curious psychic transformation occurred in the mind of the devotees of Cronus. For precisely in the act of destroying his antagonist, God B became intimately identified with him. Schelling gives three basic reasons for this identification: (a) In the first place, God B was already the god of a divided consciousness, as being both the chaotic lord of existence and at the same time the reluctant herald of the new age of civilization and coherent intelligibility.(29) To the extent that the worshipper of god B had already been affected by the spirit of A2, and perhaps had even begun using that Potency's methods and skills, any provisional "victory" of the former Potency would implicitly also redound to the credit of the latter. The "wily" quality of Cronus, in other words, already signaled his dependency upon the higher spiritual values of his opponent, Dionysus. (b) Secondly, in witnessing the violent encounter between god B and god A2, consciousness experienced an overwhelming sense of confusion. The sacrificer and the victim, the slayer and the slain, became inseparably merged in the experience of a single, transpersonal event.(30) (c) Finally, the martyrdom of god A2 constituted an eloquent and persuasive testimony to the inner power of the new religious principle. Insofar as the victim submitted to the wrath of the tyrannical nature god, that wrath was appeased. By the same token, the appeasement legitimized the demigod's sufferings as having been necessary in order for him to "earn" the status and privileges of full-fledged godhead.(31)

Later on, this identification of god B with his semi-divine victim, god A2,found expression in representations of the latter as the former's "son," "brother," or "nephew." (Thus, for example, Isaac was Abraham's son, Osiris was Set's brother, and Melkart was El's nephew.(32)) This implied, in turn, that god A2 was actually an extension of god B's own self. In consequence of this identification, the being who had previously appeared as a vengeful persecutor now came to share somewhat in his victim's ordeal: The two deities were even seen as suffering together for the sake of a noble cause. That cause, however, could only have been for the betterment of the human condition. Hence the tragic death of god A2 was credited with having ushered in the new age of spiritual enlightenment. According to Schelling, this explains how it was that the mythological consciousness could in the end ascribe to God B himself the supreme sacrifice of having given his only begotten son "for the sake of humankind."(33) And yet that "son" did not perish utterly, but was restored and allowed to continue in the role of humanity's benefactor. This, again, was apparently due to the magnanimity of God B. With a profound sense of gratitude, therefore, the people gave thanks to the great god whose mercy had saved the human race.(34) (Parallels with the Judeo-Christian concept of the Messiah should be obvious. For Schelling, pagan mythology is continuous with the doctrines of Christianity, and the Messiah is essentially a further development of the ancient prototypes.(35))

Divine Madness and the Strange Paradox of the "Dionysian" Motif

At this point, however, the reader may wish to raise an objection to the interpretation of "Dionysus" outlined above. It has just been suggested that the role of that deity in mythology was to serve as the bringer of differentiated consciousness, form, harmony, and order to a world where these had previously been lacking. Characterized as the patron of agriculture and civilization, Dionysus was allegedly the one who first introduced the benefits of a higher spiritual culture by means of tempering the baser instincts of human beings.

Yet a crucial question is, how well does this description correspond to the more common understanding of Dionysus's nature? Can it really be true that this deity was, as Schelling claims, the paradigm of humane values, refinement and self-restraint? Is it plausible to suppose that just this god should be credited with taming the barbarism of an earlier, primitive age and with instituting the reflective mental attitudes appropriate to life in civilized society? Or was he not really just the reverse? Granting that a transition might well have occurred in the development of human consciousness from the monolithically "compact" world view of pre-history to the discriminating intelligence of historical times, was Dionysus himself the catalyst of all these changes, or was he not rather the spirit of a defiant counterreaction? It seems prima facie more logical to believe that the great Loosener of social inhibitions and celebrant of the instinctual life would have been an advocate of returning to the "state of nature," indeed an archetype of what another nostalgic age would call "the noble savage."

In modern usage, the word "Dionysian" is generally associated with the frenzied, orgiastic revelries of the Bacchanalia, whose participants would lose their sense of individuality and merge in the undifferentiated unity of existence as such. During these wild festivals, it would appear, a person's ego and sense of separation from the objective world, as well as the intellect's discriminating faculty, would temporarily be suspended in favor of a liberating monism, an embracement of the irrational ground at the root of all being. Surely this sort of experience would be the polar opposite of the form-giving, rationalizing activity which might rather be associated with an Athena or an Apollo. (One is reminded, in this connection, of Nietzsche's much later distinction, in The Birth of Tragedy, between the "Dionysian" and the "Apollonian" moments of consciousness.(36))

As if these perplexities were not enough, there is also the problem of the close association between Dionysus and the cultivation of the grape. In some traditions, notably the Greek and Egyptian, Dionysus (or Osiris) was specially associated with this plant as one of his symbolic attributes. This fact, together with the circumstance that wine was the main intoxicating beverage, would appear to be more supportive of a Nietzschean than a Schellingian interpretation of Dionysus's significance. The madness of intoxication could arguably lead to a sense of undifferentiated unity with the All, whereas cool sobriety would seem more appropriate for the rational activities of civilized life.

It remains that the worship of Dionysus as practiced in ancient Greece, like the parallel worship of Osiris in Egypt and Shiva in India, did involve elements of wildly ecstatic abandonment and at times even savagery. These features of the Dionysian cult cannot be explained away. The problem facing the interpreter, therefore, is how to account for the destructive, patently uncivilized dimensions of a religious movement whose essential message allegedly was the annunciation of a higher and more humane culture. A further difficulty is to explain how a god whose true mission was the establishment of culture and higher civilization might first have manifested his influence in the form of incitement to lunacy and deranged forms of behavior. Most puzzling of all, how could the worship of Dionysus have come to be associated with the experience of losing one's sense of personal identity and merging with the an undifferentiated cosmic unity? What arguments or evidence, if any, might resolve these paradoxes?

On closer consideration, it becomes evident that the required principle of undifferentiated unity already has an assigned place in system of the Potencies: It is nothing else than the inverted first Potency, B. As explained above, however, the power of god B characteristically belongs not to Dionysus but to that deity's chief rival and antagonist, Cronus. This proposition is central to Schelling's whole interpretive framework for mythology. According to the theory, it was in fact the spirit of Cronus that was the underlying ground (as opposed to the merely proximate cause) of all the wild, orgiastic revelries.(37) Moreover, it was the influence of Cronus that, as the "inward-drawing power" opposed to multiplicity, must have been ultimately responsible for moving people to attempt the abandonment of their separate identities so as to merge in the undifferentiated experience of immediate Oneness.(38) In contrast, Dionysus was the principle of formal differentiation and order who, as god A2, sought to restrain the blind power of B. Again, it was Dionysus who worked to introduce the spirit of organic harmony into existence, without which a developed human culture would have been impossible. Surprisingly, therefore, Schelling's Dionysus must have been precisely that mythological agency whose mission it was to oppose and subordinate the so-called "Dionysian" element of experience.(39) But how is this to be understood?

Now, according to Schelling, god A2 could come into his own and establish a new world order only by means of first appeasing the old god B. This meant that the primordial ground of existence, the boundless and undifferentiated first Potency, had to receive its due, precisely in order to usher in the distinction-making and form-giving capacities of a higher rationality. In other words, god A2 had to identify himself provisionally with the same style of religious motivation and activity as used by his old antagonist, god B, imitating him for the sake of symbolically appropriating him.(40) At this still rather primitive level of spiritual evolution, the only model available for assimilating the religious values of another Potency was by means of violent conquest. It was expected that either B would destroy A2, or else A2 would destroy B. So there was no alternative at hand except to imitate the aggressive behavior of the exclusive first Potency. And yet the unconscious goal of all A2's actions was just to surmount that very mode of relationship among the Potencies.

Just as B had originally been the all-consuming fire that prevented the principles of multiplicity and individuality from developing, so now B itself must in turn be dismembered and torn to shreds in order for multiplicity to be capable of unfolding freely.(41) This could not happen directly, however; for god B would refuse to yield the position of hegemony unless and until the principle of his own being were granted some satisfaction. Hence, god A2 first had to present a version of himself as a sacrificial victim to the old titanic power of B, had to allow himself to be torn to shreds, in order to demonstrate through example how the loss of undifferentiated being could yet be transcended and overcome.

Schelling indicates that the divine antagonist, originally external to Dionysus, gradually came to be understood as actually internal to him. This process of internalization was, for Schelling, a secret of the mythological system - it was the reason why the satisfactions through appeasement, etc., could work. This certainly was not a scheme of divine justice, in the sense of propitiating a presumably higher, external authority. It was, rather, an expression of inner catharsis, in the sense of conciliating a lower principle within the god (and by extension the worshipper) himself. Ultimately, the purging action of the cathartic reenactment would bring about an acceptance of limitation and thereby an overcoming of the religious consciousness' own lower nature. Cronus would realize the necessity of his "materialization" (i.e., his subordination) and submit to the loss of his former supremacy.

The hinge point of this internal catharsis therefore depended for its efficacy upon god A2's prior success at appropriating the nature and attributes of god B. Initially, to be sure, this move resulted in a brutalization of A2, a return to the chthonic world view of an earlier age. Yet precisely by means of this retrogressive appropriation, on Schelling's interpretation, the civilizing spirit of A2 was able to penetrate the character of B and thus begin the work of rendering it harmless. The final aim was the complete subordination of B under the power of A2, in the process of which B would cease to be an "actuality" in his own right, and become instead a "potentiality" for the sake of A2 and A3. The intuitive goal, that is to say, was that B would return to the condition of being A1, bequeathing its power and serving as the throne and support for the two higher Potencies.(42) This model of transformation as proceeding by the four stages of appeasement, identification, appropriation, and subordination lies at the heart of Schelling's theory.

The other half of this mutual rapprochement of the Potencies was already discussed in the previous chapter. Together, the two movements of spiritual assimilation would bear a common fruit. For just insofar as the wrath of the "real god" was accepted as legitimate and appeased at great cost by the "relatively spiritual god," to that same extent the more primitive deity was induced in turn to identify himself with the interests of the higher. Moreover, just insofar as A2 could demonstrate to B the route to psychic recovery ("resurrection") after being most cruelly sacrificed, by the same token, B learned to acknowledge the inherent superiority of A2. Gradually, but inevitably, the moment of religious experience embodied in Cronus (viz., pantheism) came to recognize that its own deepest interest and destiny consisted in subordination to the ordering principle of A2 (systematic polytheism).

In Schelling's view, this alone explains how it was possible for the symbolically and ritually enacted synthesis of the two opposed divinities to bring about a lasting regeneration. For the mythological consciousness the intuitive hope was that the vanquished Cronus would become miraculously transformed into the triumphant Dionysus. Simultaneously, the formless unity of spiritual indeterminacy would give way to the differentiated unity of organic harmony. It was, then, this transformation - not the orgiastic experience per se of entering into an all-consuming, impersonal Oneness - that constituted the true secret underlying the worship of Dionysus.(43)

Schelling's interpretation of the mythological significance of Dionysus is nothing if not ingenious. He successfully brings out new hermeneutical possibilities and problems which previously occurred to no one. Whether or not all - or even most - features of his theories are historically accurate may well be doubted. Certainly there is an abundance of recently discovered archeological and philological evidence which was not available in the mid-nineteenth century, and which may require substantial modifications of his views.

Yet these limitations in specifics are far less important than the general design and methodology of Schelling's approach. His ground-breaking conception of psychical Potencies, including his ideas concerning their capacity for misalignment or displacement from their proper spheres of influence, anticipates in remarkable ways Carl Gustav Jung's theory of psychological archetypes. Schelling was perhaps the first modern thinker to suggest that the forms of life associated with a religion might inwardly possess a quite different significance from their surface appearances. He explored the ambivalent feelings often associated with worship and religious rituals, seeking to uncover the ways in which these ambivalences might simultaneously indicate hidden obstacles, but also new potentials for spiritual growth. He was a pioneer both of the so-called "hermeneutics of suspicion" and of the "post-critical hermeneutics" which have largely defined the horizons of modern religious thought.(44) Schelling's ideas have been extremely influential among twentieth century scholars of religion, especially on the European continent.(45) With the rapid expansion of international exchanges in world scholarship, his ideas are bound to have a growing impact on the English-speaking world as well.

Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, all notes refer to the standard edition of Schelling's works: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämmtliche Werke. Edited by Karl Friedrich A. Schelling. 14 vols. Stuttgart/Augsburg: J.G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1856-1861. Issued in two divisions, but with continuously numbered volumes in Roman numerals I-XIV.

1. Compare XI, 378 with XII, 35ff. (Actually, A1 and the other Potencies should be represented with a superscript notation, as in "A to the first power," or "A to the second power," etc., but the formatting capabilities of hypertext documents do not at present permit this.)

2. XI, 389; XII, 50.

3. XII, 55.

4. XI, 393; XII, 113. Cf. Plato's Philebus, 23b ff.

5. XI, 324.

6. XI, 311; cf. XII, 88.

7. Die Weltalter, VIII, 266f.; Eng. trans. pp. 154ff.; also XII, 164.

8. XI, 388; XII, 38.

9. Weltalter, VIII, 215; Eng. trans., p. 101; also XI, 391; XII, 87.

10. Weltalter, VIII, 211; Eng. trans., p. 97; also XII, 84, 87.

11. XII, 85, 110.

12. XI, 390, 396f.; XII, 85, 110f.

13. XII, 125ff. For the relation of mythology to language, see XI, 50ff., 65.

14. XII, 190ff. The term "real" does not imply that any other gods would be "unreal." It serves, rather, to emphasize the sheer spatio-temporal existence of B. A2, by contrast, will be described as "the relatively spiritual god."

15. XI, 178; cf. 119.

16. XI, 103f.

17. XI, 103f., 233f.; XII, 35ff., 182ff.

18. XI, 94ff.; XII, 182.

19. For more on the "Great Spiritual Crisis," cf. XI, 19, 24, 100ff., 233.

20. XII, 171, 253. Much later in the dialectical development, Schelling will argue that the first Potency must return to the position of the "Center." At that point, however, it will no longer be there for the sake of self-aggrandizement, nor will it any longer be in the role of an "actual" being, but will have voluntarily returned to the subordinate status of being an eternal "potentiality." Cf. XII, 579, 643f.

21. XII, 293f.

22. XI, 168; XII, 637; XIII, 436f.

23. XII, 306f., 380; XIII, 437.

24. XII, 273f., 300. Compare XII, 182ff., where Schelling describes the sense of well-being associated with the originally unencumbered pantheism.

25. XII, 269.

26. XII, 274, 288, 323.

27. XII, 300.

28. For Schelling's exposition of the Phoenician myth cycle, see XII, 327-49; for the Egyptian, 364-79; for the Greek, 618-19, 627-44; for the Hebrew, XI, 164 and XII, 304.

29. XII, 298, 321f.

30. XIII, 401.

31. XII, 275, 307, 311, 372.

32. Cf. XII, 304, 312f., 371.

33. XII, 313, 324.

34. Cf. XII, 315ff.

35. XII, 321ff.

36. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie. Oder: Griechenthum und Pessimismus (Leipzig: E.W. Fritzsch, 1871); English translation by W. Kaufmann, The Birth of Tragedy (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

37. XII, 351.

38. XI, 103f., 178; XII, 368, 380; XIII, 388.

39. Cf. XIII, 435f.

40. XII, 321, 341, 343. These passages refer primarily to the Heraklean myth cycle. Recall that Herakles was often associated with Dionysus himself (XII, 348).

41. XIII, 386f.

42. XII, 88, 124; XIII, 473.

43. XIII, 435f.

44. For these terms, cf. Paul Ricoeur, "The Critique of Religion," translated by R.B. DeFord, in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, C.E. Reagan and D. Steward, eds. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), pp. 213-222. See also by Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, translated by D. Savage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 28.

45. See my recently published book, The Potencies of God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).