Amber Steed
English 343/Jones
04-23-01
Cultural Analysis: The Neoconservative Phenomenon
Neoconservatism is a relatively recent term, no more than thirty or forty years old. In fact, many of its members never truly accepted the term at all. And while its name may be relatively easy to pinpoint, its roots refuse to be tied to any one person, event, or movement. Rather, neoconservatism stems from a number of social and political factors.
One of the largest sociopolitical factors in the development of neoconservatism revolves around the 1960s liberal movement. Himmelstein states in his book, To the Right, that a number of "factors contributed to a general crisis of confidence in American institutions and created a political opening for . . . the Right, which presented itself in the late 1970s as a ‘revitalization movement’" (6). It seems that Himmelstein is describing a progression parallel to the liberal movement of the 1960s, on a smaller scale and with an alternative ideology hindered by fewer limitations. Accordingly, Francis states, in Beautiful Losers, that "the emergence in the 1970s of the political and intellectual movement known as "neoconservatism" is generally regarded as a response to the failures of conventional liberalism to deal effectively with the challenges of that decade [i.e. 1960s]" (95). So, are we to believe that neoconservatism stems exclusively from disenchanted 1960s liberals? Irving Kristol, a noted fore-founder of the movement, attaches an even more specific label, describing neoconservatism as "the erosion of liberal faith among a relatively small . . . group of scholars and intellectuals, and the movement of this group toward a more conservative point of view," without completely conforming to the traditional Republican Party (x). The list of varying definitions goes on, yet each has neoconservatism claiming liberal (often academic/intellectual) roots. But how can such a widespread phenomenon as neoconservatism be limited to such a finite group? It is true that neoconservatism got its start through a small number of intellectuals, most notably the aforementioned Irving Kristol, as well as Norman Podhoretz, Michael Novak, and Peter Berger. Yet Dorrien states, in The Neoconservative Mind, that "not all of the neoconservatives came from the Old Left" (6). Perhaps the former liberals, in their reluctance to accept their newfound connection to conservatism, were blind to the "silent majority" of neoconservative Americans who were not tied to liberalism at all.
It was this "silent majority" that, according to Kaiser, in 1968 in America, "had grown tired of rapid change and terrified of continuing disorder" (227). This sense of "disorder" could have stemmed, in part, from the overwhelming media attention devoted to the relatively small population of radical liberals. Many Americans of the "silent majority" found a refreshing and authoritative voice to their disdain for radical liberals during the Nixon administration of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In a 1968 speech given by Nixon, recorded by White in The Making of the President—1968, Nixon talks about America’s voice; "a quiet voice in the tumult of the shouting. It is the voice of the great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans, the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators" (317). Though many early neoconservatives were former liberals, it is quite possible that they harbored the spotlight of this "new movement" because of their experience doing so during their more liberal days. In any case, the development of neoconservatism was not exclusive to former liberals of the 1960s, but a union between Americans with both liberal and conservative pasts.
Due to the heterogeneous foundation of neoconservatism, the movement’s ideology was neither exclusively liberal nor Old Right. Neoconservatism, according to Dorrien, "promotes militant anticommunism, capitalist economics, a minimal welfare state, the rule of traditional elites, and a return to traditional cultural values" (8). The last stance in Dorrien’s list is likely a rebuttal to the "loose morals" of the 1960s liberal hippies—definitively a conservative stance. In fact, a number of groups formed out of the neoconservative movement in response to this return to "traditional cultural values," such as the Christian Coalition and the Moral Majority. A minimalization of welfare also stems from conservativism, which believes that the state is too involved in the free enterprise system already. In reality, most neoconservative views are fundamentally conservative, despite the movement’s liberal roots. However, some stances overlap between the liberal and conservative camps, such as the belief in capitalist economics and varying degrees of anticommunism—though neither liberals nor conservatives are declaratively militant. Yet overall, neoconservatism is a close relative of traditional conservatism.
Despite the commonalities between neoconservatives and traditionals, Ehrman states, in The Rise of Neoconservatism, that "the traditional right was at first suspicious of the new converts, but soon welcomed" them as they proved their competency "in all those modern institutions out of which influence can be radiated" (45). The "modern institutions" to which Ehrman refers are, in large part, the wealth of journals dedicated to politics, theology, economics, and much more. Examples of these include Commentary, The Public Interest, The New Criterion, and Forbes. In fact, Dorrien claims that "no other intellectual movement in America has established as many high-quality journals as the neoconservatives" (9). A substantial degree of influence over corporate-funded policy centers is also a hallmark of the neoconservative repertoire—the Institute on Religion and Public Life, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), are just a few organizations tied to neoconservativism. To generalize, Himmelstein states that "the march of the Right to power in the late 1970s and early 1980s fed upon three developments, the rise of the New Religious Right, the mobilization of corporate conservatism, and the revitalization of the Republican party" (8). After citing examples of the first two of Himmelstein’s three developments, we will now examine the latter through the politics of the Regan administration.
In the years leading up to and during the Regan administration, the neoconservative ideology meshed relatively well with Republican dogma of the time. Dorrien notes that "[neconservatism’s] ideological stridency perfectly suited the new president during the early years of his presidency. Neoconservatism hit its political high-water mark in the mid-1980s" (10). Evidence of this newfound political affluence can be seen by the appointments of neoconservatives to power positions—Jeane Kirkpatrick as ambassador to the United Nations, Elliot Abrams as assistant secretary of state for international organizations, Richard Perle as assistant secretary of defense, and many others. Dorrien also states that "it is rare that an intellectual movement significantly affects American politics. Neoconservatism has been such an exception" (8). As mentioned previously, neoconservatives also established journals while expanding corporate contacts throughout the 1980s. Overall, the neoconservatives taught the business class how to think politically, while telling the Republican president how to run the domestic and foreign policies of America.
Neoconservatism’s political plateau did not last, however, as growing opposition from "paleoconservatives" forced them to return to their journals, universities, think tanks, and columns to express their political dissatisfaction. The appointments during the Regan administration, and thus the degree of political (not to mention corporate) control that neoconservatives had grown to enjoy inspired too much resentment to be continued during Bush’s presidency. Dorrien stated in 1993 that "it is unlikely that neoconservatism can regain in the 1990s the political influence it achieved in the 1980s" (8). His prophecy has seemed to fulfill itself, as Bush mostly sought to avoid the controversy of the neoconservatives during his presidency. Clinton also proved disappointing to hopeful neoconservatives, disenchanted by their late 1980s and 1990s decline. Clinton had too many democrats to satisfy, and due to the tainted past of neoconservatives (in regards to the late Regan administration), they were given no appointments. Despite the lack of neoconservative positions in the white house during the Clinton era, their political siesta has allowed them to reinforce their declining journals and refresh their ideology.
However, the future is yet to be seen, as Dorrien states that "whether they [neoconservatives] can fashion an intellectual tradition lasting more than one generation is an open question" (18). The early movement of neoconservatism rose out of the ashes of failed liberalism, joined by the frustrated "silent majority" of the 1960s. During the 1970s, many found a refreshing voice in the Nixon administration, but did not form a true political or corporate force until their rise during the Regan years. Bitter opposition, however, denied neoconservatism growth after its political and corporate "heyday" of the late 1970s and 1980s, forcing the movement into decline during the Bush and Clinton years. For this relatively young and malleable movement, however, it remains to be seen whether the future holds its finest hour, or its last.
Works Cited
Dorrien, Gary. The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993.
Ehrman, John. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945- 1994. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
Francis, Samuel. Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993.
Himmelstein, Jerome L. To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism. Berkely: University of California Press, 1990.
Kaiser, Charles. 1968 in America: Music, Politics, Chaos, Counterculture, and the Shaping of a Generation. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988.
Kristol, Irving. Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
White, Theodore H. The Making of the President—1968. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1969.