by William K. Mahony, in the Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Eliade, editor-in-chief, 15 volumes (New York: MacMillan, 1987), vol. 4, pp. 329-332

It is somewhat difficult to find a suitable South Asian word to represent what in English is known as "religion," admittedly a rather vague and encompassing term. Perhaps the most suitable would be the Sanskrit dharma, which can be translated in a variety of ways, all of which are pertinent to traditional Indian religious ideas and practices.

Encyclopedia of Religion, Hindu Dharma, Vol.4, p.329

Derived from the Sanskrit root dhr, "sustain, support, uphold," dharma has a wide range of meaning: it is the essential foundation of something or of things in general, and thus signifies "truth"; it is that which is established, customary, proper, and therefore means "traditional" or "ceremonial"; it is one’s duty, responsibility, imperative, and thereby "moral obligation"; it is that which is right, virtuous, meritorious, and accordingly "ethical"; and it is that which is required, precepted, or permitted through religious authority, and thus "legal."

The aggregate connotation here suggests that in South Asian cultures dharma represents "correctness," both in a descriptive sense ("the way things are") and in a prescriptive one ("the way things should be"), and reflects the inextricable connection in the religious thought of India between ontology, ritual ideology, social philosophy, ethics, and canon law.

Types of Dharma. South Asian religious and legal systems have presented a variety of definitions of dharma and have seen different modes of its expression in the world and in society. Despite those variations, however, certain notions have remained consistent throughout South Asian history.

Dharma and rita in the Vedic period. The oldest sense of the word—which appears as early as the Rgveda (c. 1200 BCE), usually as dharman — signifies cosmic ordinance, often in connection with the sense of natural or divine law. As such, it is closely related conceptually to the Vedic notion of rita, the universal harmony in which all things in the world have a proper place and function. The two terms differ in meaning in that whereas rita is an impersonal law, dharman characterizes those personal actions that engender or maintain cosmic order. The Rgveda typically discusses such sustaining actions as those pertaining to the gods, especially Mitra and Varuna, who are said to separate the day from night, regulate the seasons, and make the rains fall from the skies.

While the expression adharma ("against dharma") does not appear until a few centuries later, the germ of the idea lies in the term anrita ("against rita"), a synonym in the Rgveda for asatya, "untrue," in the sense of "unreal." This suggests the notion that improper action leads to the fall of the universe into unreality, and thus to nonbeing. The implication here is that in classical Vedic literatures dharma carries ontological weight: being arises out of proper activity while improper action leads to nonbeing. This ontological aspect leads to the normative notion that, in the Samhita literatures, dharma is the system of activity that guides the world in such a way that rita is not violated. This means that each of the gods has a personality that, although each is different, is intrinsically in harmony with the natural world.

It is important to note further that as early as the Rgveda this "proper action" is connected to the gods’ ritual activity, and, to a lesser extent, their ascetic practices. In Rgveda 5.63.7, for example, the terms rita and dharman appear together in association with vrata ("vow, religious rite"): "You, Mitra and Varuna, through the creative powers of the gods, protect the ceremonial vows [vrata] with actions which uphold the world [dharma]. Through cosmic order [rita] you rule over the whole universe. You placed the sun in the heavens, like a shining chariot." This suggests that the Vedic poets not only saw an efficacious connection between primordial cosmic order and the gods’ power to maintain that order, they also understood that such sustaining power resides at least in part in the performance of ceremonial actions.

Varnashramadharma and svadharma. At the time of the composition of the Brahmanas (c. 900-600 BCE) the fundamental laws of the universe were understood to be reflected not only in the gods’ actions, but, more importantly, in the human priest’s performance of rituals prescribed in those texts and designed to ensure a person’s well-being in the world to come. Dharma is therefore closely aligned with the South Asian concept of karman — the idea that one’s actions in the present determine the conditions of one’s life in the future. This ideological connection grew firmer through the generations, so that by the second century BCE an important lawbook could typically assert that "those who support dharma as it is presented in sacred tradition and in revelation gain fame in this world and incomparable happiness after death" (Laws of Manu 2.9).

From this sacerdotal and eschatological stance arises a normative dimension to dharma in which the term comes to mean the sum total of one’s obligations by which one "fits in" with the natural and particularly the social world. This is especially pertinent in regard to the duties determined by one’s social class (varna) and stage of life (ashrama). Thus, for example, a priest (brahmana) ensures the health of society by securing the goodwill of the gods through various rituals; a king or soldier (kshatriya) protects the people from others; a merchant (vaishya) produces material goods to benefit the people; and a laborer (shudra) works in order that all of the above may function smoothly. Similarly, a student (brahmacharin) is to study diligently in order to know the sacred tradition; a householder (grhastha) ensures the continuation of society by establishing a family; a forest hermit (vanaprastha) contributes to the welfare of his ancestors by privately performing ritual oblations; and a renunciant (sannyasin) procures his final release from the world through homeless asceticism. Subsumed as a whole, this system of social obligations is known as varnashramadharma.

Varnashramadharma reflects a temporal dimension in orthodox Hindu normative thought. That is, just as a person gains rights and responsibilities while moving in this life from one ashrama to the next, he claims certain privileges and accepts specific obligations according to his present varna, which is determined by his actions in a previous life. Here, again, we see a close ideological assumption connecting dharma and karman.

It is important to note that the various obligations incumbent on members of the different varnas and ashramas mutually support each other, and that an imperfect performance of one’s responsibilities harms society — and thus the world — as a whole. Furthermore, these moral obligations inhere within the specific varnas and ashramas themselves and cannot be assumed by a person of another place in society. As the Bhagavad-gita asserts in a well-known teaching: "It is better to perform one’s own obligations [svadharma] poorly than to do another’s well" (Bhagavadgita 3.45, 18.47).

The term svadharma(particular responsibilities) in this last passage is not to be understood as referring to one’s individual or chosen personal obligations. Rather, svadharma describes an impersonal generic ethical category which encapsulates one’s duties determined by one’s place in society. All farmers therefore have the same svadharma, but no farmer has the same svadharma as, say, a military officer. Svadharma thus embodies the same ethical values as does varnashrama-dharma, and the two terms are nearly synonymous.

Apaddharma. Some texts note that at times such as severe economic or natural calamity the norms determined by varna and ashrama may be suspended so that society can survive the stress. For example, a priest may assume in those times the duties of a soldier, or a king may take up the responsibilities of a merchant, but they may do so only for the shortest possible time. Such a "duty determined by emergency" is known as apaddharma. However, at no time — even in moments of severe distress — can a person who is not a priest earn a living by teaching the Veda or by performing Vedic ceremonies.

Sadharanadharma, samanyadharma, and sanatana-dharma. Most authoritative texts further assert that all people, regardless of their age and occupation, should observe some common moral obligations. A representative list of such responsibilities appears in the Artha-shastra, which notes that everyone must refrain from injuring others and must tell the truth, live purely, practice goodwill, be forgiving, and exercise patience at all times (Arthashastra 1.3.13). Such rules are known as sadharana ("pertaining to everybody"), samanya ("common"), or sanatana ("eternal") in scope.

Sometimes, however, the obligations derived from svadharma directly contradict those imperatives of sadharanadharma, and a person trying to make an ethical decision must choose between opposing demands. What happens, for instance, when a priest must offer a blood sacrifice or a soldier must fight and kill the enemy? Sadharanadharma admonishes them to practice noninjury to all living beings, yet their respective svadharmas command them to kill. What is their moral obligation?

Different religious traditions offered various responses to such a quandary. In general, those based most thoroughly in Brahmanic ideology maintained that in order to support cosmic and social harmony one must follow one’s svadharma at all times, even in those instances when it means breaking the rules of sadharana-dharma. Thus, the priest must offer the ritual; the soldier must fight. On the other hand, traditions influenced by the Vedanta, Buddhism, and Jainism taught that the demands of sadharanadharma always overrule those of svadharma. Here, the priest should refuse to perform the sacrifice, and the soldier should lay down his arms. A third alternative was offered by the ideology of bhakti, selfless and loving devotion to a personal and supreme deity, in which all actions are performed in service of God’s will. In this case, the priest or the soldier should or should not kill, depending on what God demands of him at the particular moment. The problem here (and it is a problem in theological ethics in general) is: how does one know at any given moment what God wants?

The bhakti response to such a question in general affirms a direct comprehension of divine will through a personal experience that may or may not be consistent with the precepts established by orthodox tradition. In terms of canon law, however, the inherently fluid nature of such experience is such that bhakti ideology has found little place in traditional modes of decision making.

Authoritative Sources of Dharma. Metaethical quandaries ("how does one know what is right?") appear in legal as well as in theological circles, and therefore questions of authority arose even in systems revolving around the structures of varnashramadharma. In order to adjudicate such problems, most orthodox traditions affirmed three sources (mula) for ethical and legal decisions: divine revelation, sacred tradition, and the practices of the wise. Some texts add a fourth, namely, conscience. These references are serial in nature, revelation being the most determinative and conscience being the least influential.

Shruti. According to orthodox thought the primary source for all knowledge, legal and otherwise, lies in the Vedic canon comprised of the Mantra Samhitas (liturgical hymns of the Rgveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, and Atharvaveda), ceremonial instructions (Brahmanas), and philosophical treatises (Aranyakas and Upanishads). Together these texts constitute shruti, revealed eternal truths (literally, "that which is heard"). In all orthodox traditions shruti was the primary source of normative guidance. Nothing could go against the values and doctrines presented in shruti and continue to be considered ethical.

Interpretation of the often apparently unsystematic or imprecise nature of shruti literatures was, however, a complicated task. Accordingly, during the Vedic era the scholar-sage Jaimini began a tradition of interpretation known as the Mimamsa, which centered on the thorough "investigation" (mimamsa) into the meaning of Vedic texts in order to discern their normative imperatives.

Smriti. Not all questions of dharma could be resolved through reference to the timeless shruti. Thus, orthodox philosophers and legalists looked also to those more temporal literatures that were passed through the generations. These texts were known as smriti, "remembered" truths and injunctions. Smriti comprises the six Vedangas ("ancillary texts," collections of aphoristic treatises [sutras] that interpret the Veda), the epics Mahabharata (including the Bhagavadgita) and Ramayana, and the Puranas ("stories of old; sacred myths").

Although all of these texts address concerns relating to dharma, the most direct in their evaluations are those of the six Vedangas, one of which is made up of the Kalpasutras, or teachings on proper activity. The Kalpasutras address three major concerns, each undertaken by a different literary group: the Shrautasutras interpret large public rituals; the Grhasutras teach the proper ways to perform domestic ceremonies; and the Dharmasutras elucidate the obligations of the sacred community.

Somewhat later (c. 100 CE) a new genre of literatures known as the Dharmashastras began to appear. These are specialized works dealing with specific imperatives and problems in Vedic dharma. The most influential of these treatises is probably the Manava Dharmashastra (The Laws of Manu), which outlines the various rights and responsibilities inherent in the different varnas and ashramas of traditional Vedic society.

Sadacharadharma and shistacharadharma. Most classical texts admit that the example given by the honored members of society serves as a third means by which dharma may be discerned. If shruti and smriti both fail to elucidate a problem, then the community may look for guidance in the actions of people who "practice what is right" (sadachara), or who generally "act according to [Vedic] instruction" (shistachara). According to the Dharmashastras, such people should be virtuous, learned, slow to anger, free of jealousy, contented, modest, and so on.

"Conscience." The Laws of Manu and other Dharmashastras teach, finally, that when these three sources of dharma fail to enlighten an ethically perplexed person, then he or she has recourse to what is described as "that which satisfies the self" (atmanas tustir; Laws of Manu 2.6) or "that which pleases the self" (priyam atmanah; Laws of Manu 2.12). The vagaries of this category, however, are such that in legal terms personal feelings carry relatively little weight and are always superseded by shruti, smriti, and sadachara.

Bühler, Georg, trans. The Sacred Laws of the Aryas. Sacred Books of the East, vol. 2 (Apastambha and Gautama Dharmasutras) and vol. 14 (Baudhayana and Vasistha Dharmasutras), edited by F. Max Müller. Oxford, 1879 and 1882.

Bühler, Georg, trans. The Laws of Manu (1886). Sacred Books of the East, vol. 25. Reprint, Delhi, 1964.

Edgerton, Franklin, trans. Bhagavad-gita (1925). Reprint, Oxford, 1944.

Eggeling, Julius, trans. and ed. The Satapatha-Brahmana. 5 vols. Sacred Books of the East, vols. 12, 26, 41, 43, 44. Oxford, 1882-1900.

Gharpure, J. R., trans. Hindu Law Texts: Yajñavalkya Smriti, with Commentaries by Vijñanesvara, Mitra-misra and Sulapani. 7 vols. Bombay, 1936-1942.

Jolly, Julius, trans. The Institutes of Visnu (1880). Sacred Books of the East, vol. 7. Reprint, Delhi, 1962. A translation of the Visnu Dharmasutra.

Jolly, Julius, trans. The Minor Law Books (1889). Sacred Books of the East, vol. 33. Reprint, Delhi, 1965. A translation of the Brhaspati and Narada Dharmashastras.

Kane, P. V., ed. and trans. Katyayana Dharmashastra. Poona, 1933.

Keith, Arthur Berriedale, trans. Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and Kausitaki Brahmanas of the Rigveda (1920). Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 25. Reprint, Delhi, 1971.

O’Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, ed. and trans. The Rig Veda: An Anthology. Harmondsworth, 1982.

Whitney, William Dwight, trans. Atharva-Veda Samhita. 2 vols. (1905). Harvard Oriental Series, vols. 7 and 8. Reprint, Delhi, 1962.

Aiyangar, K. V. Rangaswami. Some Aspects of the Hindu View of Life according to Dharmashastra. Baroda, 1952.

Jayaswal, K. P. Manu and Yajñavalkya: A Comparison and a Contrast; A Treatise on the Basic Hindu Law. Calcutta, 1930.

Jolly, Julius. Recht und Sitte. Strassburg, 1896. Translated by Batakrishna Ghosh as Hindu Law and Custom (1928; reprint, Varanasi, 1975).

Kane, P. V. History of Dharmashastra. 2d ed. 5 vols. in 7. Poona, 1968-1975.

Lingat, Robert. Les sources du droit dans le système traditionnel de l’Inde. Paris, 1967. Translated by J. Duncan M. Derrett as The Classical Law of India. Berkeley, 1973.

Mees, Gualtherus H. Dharma and Society. The Hague, 1935.

O’Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, and J. Duncan M. Derrett. The Concept of Duty in South Asia. New Delhi, 1978.

Sen Gupta, Nares Chandra. Sources of Law and Society in Ancient India. Calcutta, 1914.

For a more extensive bibliography, see Ludo Rocher’s "Droit hindou ancien," vol. E, part 6 of Bibliographical Introduction to Legal History and Ethnology, edited by John Gilissen (Brussels, 1965).

WILLIAM K. MAHONY