Introduction to Philosophy
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
Dr. Ned Beach, Instructor
Fall, 2007

Essay Topic #1: Robert Blatchford, "The The Delusion of Free Will"

"Robert Blatchford maintains a position of "hard determinism," arguing against free will. He holds that human behavior is determined by two main causal influences. What are these and why, according to him, are they sufficient to explain human behavior? If it should be objected that a person can, after all, 'do as he likes,' Blatchford has a ready answer. What is it, and how does it corroborate his argument as a whole?

Students' Answer: Human behavior, according to Blatchford, is compelled by heredity and environment. Every aspect of human behavior is affected by these two factors.

If a person believes that he/she can "do as he [or she] likes," Blatchford would say ask him [or her] why he/she likes, and he/she will find the error of the theory of free will. Any answer one may try to provide for this question will always be a product of heredity or environment.

Comment: The above answer is basically correct, but it doesn't explain the details sufficiently. In the first place, one should take note of why Blatchford is convinced that human behavior is adequately explained by heredity and the environment alone. Blatchford doesn't actually go into this much in his essay, but it's clear that he espouses the theory of "hard determinism," i.e., that for any event in the universe, there is always a set of sufficient conditions such that, given those conditions, the event has to follow. The reason why Blatchford (and many others) believe in this theory is that it corresponds perfectly to the methods and guiding assumptions of modern science. The enormous success of science in its ability to predict and control the flow of events in nature is predicated on the firm conviction that nature is a totally regular, seamless web of causes and effects.

With regard to human behavior, Blatchford admits that our thoughts, feelings, and desires do play a major role in determining how we will act. But, he says, those subjective factors are themselves caused by the nexus of cause and effect. Further, he argues that our actions in various life situations are in fact much more predictable than we like to admit. The examples of the hunter versus the vegetarian with a gun in hand and a rabbit in view illustrates his theme: we can correctly predict that the hunter will shoot whereas the vegetarian will not. Where, then, is the evidence for a "free will"? Blatchford sees none.

As a final salvo against his opponents, Blatchford points out that even they take care to raise their own children in as wholesome an environment as possible. In doing so, they implicitly admit that the role of the environment in shaping their children's lives is an overwhelmingly powerful force. Nobody truly relies on a mythical "free wil" to insulate impressionable children -- or adults -- from the effects of heredity and the environment.

Essay Topic #2: Walter Terence Stace, "The Problem of Free Will"

"Explain Walter Terence Stace's 'compatibilist' position regarding the apparent conflict between determinism and free will. Does Stace believe it is possible for human beings to escape causal determinations in some manner that Blatchford denies or overlooks? Why, or why not?"

Students' Answer:

Stace argues that determinism and free will are compatible positions. That is, they can both be true.  He believes that most events are determined by the laws of cause and effect, but there still are some events -- namely, voluntary human actions -- where free will can occur.  In these cases, individual choice is the deciding factor in what an individual will do.  Heredity and environment may somewhat influence how the individual initially feels as a first impression, or it may even put a slant on what they would usually have a tendency to do in that kind of a situation, but it is still possible for them to override those causal determinants and make up their own mind about what to do.  This is why Stace's position is sometimes called "soft determinism," or "compatibilism," because it's not as rigid as Blatchford's "hard determinism."

Blatchford thinks that for any event, there is a set of conditions, such that, given those conditions, the event must follow.  Stace agrees for the most part, but he points out that if an act is uncompelled or not controlled by an external force, then it can be free. In those circumstances, Stace believes it is possible for human beings to escape causal determination from heredity and environment, and this is what makes his version of determinism more flexible than Blatchford's.

Instructor's Comment:

Although it makes a couple of valid points, this essay is on the whole rather confused.  Its principal error is to suppose that Stace's theory of "soft determinism" is any less committed than "hard determinism" to the central determinist hypothesis, or any less "rigid" in its insistance that all events, even voluntary human actions, are completely controlled by the laws of cause and effect. As such, Stace would agree with Blatchford that all human actions are in principle predictable.

Stace achieves his reconciliation of determinism and free will by means of watering down the concept of "free will" to the point where it means nothing more than that the agent wanted to do what he or she necessarily had to do.  (In a way, therefore, it would be more accurate to describe his position as "soft voluntarism" rather than "soft determinism," for it is the notion of "free will" that he qualifies and softens, not at all the concept of determinism.)  This is the reason why Stace can claim that free will and determinism are compatible with each other. To be sure, Stace grants that one can define "free will" in a sense that is inconsistent with determinism, but this strong sense of "freedom" -- as meaning the absence of any causal determinants of the will -- is, he says, completely implausible in any case.

If asked whether there is ever an event lacking a set of conditions such that, given those conditions, the event necessarily had to follow, Stace would say no.  He agrees, therefore, with Blatchford that there is no "free will" in this strong sense, and he does so for the same reasons -- namely, that all events in nature are connected in a tight causal chain.

On the other hand, Stace maintains that there is another understanding of "free will" in a weak sense, one that is both more congruent with ordinary language and also consistent with determinism. According to this definition, a "free act" is one that (as the students correctly stated), is uncompelled by any external forces. For example, if Gandhi decided to go on a voluntary hunger-strike for ethical reasons, we would describe this action in ordinary English as "free" (using the weak sense of "freedom"). But at the same time, Stace would acknowledge that the action was not "free" in the strong sense, because it did have internal causes (in the form of Gandhi's habits, tendencies, and desires), and therefore was in principle predictable.

To sum up, in answering this question one should (1) distinguish between the strong and weak senses of "free will"; (2) define what is meant by "compatibilism"; (3) observe that Stace does not regard it as possible for human beings to escape the chain of causal determination; and (4) explain how determinism is consistent with free will in the weak sense, though not in the strong sense.

Essay Topic #3: Richard Taylor, "Freedom and Determinism"

"Richard Taylor tries to steer a middle course in the controversy between the determinists and the voluntarists (advocates of free will). To begin with, however, he dismisses the position of compatibilism such as that maintained by Stace. Why? Taylor further rejects indeterminism as a solution to the problem. What difficulties does he find here? Finally, Taylor proposes 'two items of data' to which, he suggests, any adequate theory of volition must do justice. What are those two items, and what theory does Taylor ultimately espouse on their account? Does Taylor claim to be certain of the theory he proposes? Why, or why not?"

Students' Answer:

Taylor dismisses the position of compatibilism because it only camouflages the idea of free will. He continues to support this with the idea that people should themselves believe in free will. Taylor finds difficulties in indeterminism because it is not free, voluntary, or responsible. His two terms of data are (1) that my behavior is sometimes the outcome of my deliberation and (2) that in these and other cases it is sometimes up to me what I do. He ultimately espouses the theory of agency (self-determinism) to this data. We do not exactly understand this theory, and even he is not certain of this theory. He states, "Our data... rests upon nothing more than fairly common consent. These data might simply be illusions" (p. 134). Taylor is telling us that deliberation is real, hence free will may be actual, therefore self-determination might be true. You will never be for sure if you have free will, but we should think of ourselves as self-determining agents so that we will claim responsibility for our actions.

Instructor's Comment:

This essay makes a very good start, but it remains incomplete. Still needed are: (a) an explanation why compatibilism only "camouflages" the problem of free will; (b) why he asserts that indeterminism "is not free, voluntary, or responsible"; (c) what the difference is between genuinely deliberating and merely discovering via introspection what one is necessitated to do; and (d) a hint about the unique metaphysical realm that Taylor's theory postulates.

(a) Compatibilism only camouflages the problem of free will, according to Taylor, because it just pushes the puzzle of agency back one step in the process. By defining an action as "free" (in the weak sense) as long as it stems from the agent's own motives and desires, the compatibilists suppose they have solved the problem. But how useful is this notion of "freedom"? Taylor asks. Does it establish the possibility of moral autonomy and responsibility for one's actions? Hardly, because even a zombie, drug addict, or electronically wired human "puppet" would be "free" in the weak sense. In effect, Taylor is pointing out that Blatchford's so-called "hard determinism" is more straightforward and honest than Stace's slippery version of "soft determinism."

(b) Indeterminism, whether it is true or not, has no bearing on the question of free will, according to Taylor. The mere fact that a person's nerves might suddenly fire without a determining cause wouldn't make her responsible; instead, it would reduce her to "an erratic and jerking phantom" (p. 129).

(c) If I were a human puppet whose every action, thought and feeling was determined by antecedent causes, then the most I could do would be to "introspect" (i.e., gaze upon the inward workings of my own mind), in hopes of discovering the operative causes that would determine my behavior. In other words, I would be looking for signs and traces of those causal forces that would make me execute my future actions. This attitude, which I already adopt toward the behavior of other persons, would now have to be turned upon myself. But such is not the case, Taylor observes. The process of deliberating is not like that of self-discovery; rather, I have the experience of being the originator and initiator of my own actions. The fact of this experience cannot be denied, even though, as the students have rightly pointed out, "you will never be for sure if you have free will."

(d) Finally, it is important to note that the theory of "self determinism" makes a number of remarkable claims that are far from obvious.  Taylor even suggests that his theory requires the postulation of "a metaphysical realm wholly different from that appropriate to the understanding of nonliving things" (p. 133). The behavior of ordinary things is describable in terms of the causal forces that act upon them and which, in turn, they exert upon other things. But a self-determining agent cannot be understood as either a "cause" or "effect" in the traditional sense. Such a being is a new kind of entity, nowhere else to be found in the universe, an "originator" or "initiator" of actions which is not, however, a "cause." It is an emergent phenomenon, so mysterious in its inner workings that Taylor admits we cannot grasp it. Yet we must acknowledge its possibility on account our undeniable experience of autonomy and moral responsibility.

Essay Topic #4: Karl Menninger, "The Crime of Punishment"

"What is Karl Menninger's argument concerning the implications of causal determinacy for the proper understanding of the meaning and purpose of punishment? What model of punishment does he recommend in place of the old retributivist (or retaliative) model, and why?"

Students' Answer:

Karl Menninger argues that it is necessary to understand how the implications of causal determinancy affect the understanding of the meaning and purpose of punishment. The American society, according to Menninger, wants crime, needs crime and gains satisfaction from it. The use of current punishments allows the society to commit crimes legally. Menninger maintains that punishment is society's crime against the criminals and against society. We as a society also punish for justice. We believe that punishment makes everything all right. However, only according to the chairman of the President's National Crime Commission, the current punishment system is not working, because most Americans want crime's services. Most Americans also view crime as inevitable and sometimes desirable. Menninger states that until this view changes, crime will continue to flourish. Menninger observes that part of the problem with crime is that the same people are committing the crimes time and again. This shows that the current system of rehabilitation is not doing its job properly. He continues that crime should be considered an illness and should be treated like an illness. He suggests that we adopt a program that uses the therapeutic attitude for rehabilitation. This program would not have attitudes of avoidance, ridicule, scorn, or punitiveness against the criminal. Those things cause that person to remain a criminal, because society won't allow him or her to be a part of it again. Instead, the criminals are forever branded criminals.

This system requires both love and hope from the care givers and generally the society as a whole. "The secret of success in all programs, however, is the replacement of the punitive attitude with a therapeutic attitude," states Menninger. He also says that, while not all criminals can be handled in this fashion, the majority can. "The great majority of offenders, even 'criminals,' should never become prisoners if we want to 'cure' them." Also according to Menninger, "Before we can diminish our sufferings from the ill-controlled aggressive assaults of fellow citizens, we must renounce the philosophy of punishment, the obsolete, vengeful penal attitude. In its place we would see a comprehensive constructive social attitude -- therapeutic in some instances, restraining in some instances, but preventive in its total social impact.... Unless this message is heard,...we cannot expect to preserve our peace, our public safety, or our mental health."

Instructor's Comment:

This is an excellent account, but considerably longer and more detailed than necessary for the exam. Menninger's chief points must not be permitted to disappear in the midst of all these facts. The main ideas are simple enough: (1) that since all human behavior is determined by antecedent causes, therefore no one is truly an autonomous moral agent; (2) that the people who behave in antisocial ways are best understood as sick, malfunctioning, or deranged, but not as wicked sinners; and consequently (3) that the goal of society's correctional facilities should be to treat criminal through therapeutic behavior-modification, but without any retributive or punitive intent.

Essay Topic #5: Clive Staples Lewis, "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment"

"What is C.S. Lewis's argument concerning the minimum requirements of justice with respect to the meaning and purpose of punishment? What model of punishment does he recommend in place of the modern therapeutic model, and why?"

Student's Answer:

Treatment as punishment deprives criminals of their rights as human beings and instead transforms them into psychological "cases." It also takes the entire concept of desert and retribution out of punishment. Therefore, punishment is no longer justifiable by modern standards. The humanitarian theory is, in reality, inhumane.

Instructor's Comment:

This is entirely correct as far as it goes, but it is somewhat too brief. The main point to emphasize is that the therapeutic model of punishment, precisely because it denies that anybody is truly responsible for bad behavior, therefore undertakes to impose enforced "treatments" on persons without regard to their guilt or innocence. The whole question of guilt has thereby fallen out of the equation. As a result, the "humanitarian" sees nothing wrong with depriving people of their liberty and subjecting them to years of psychological therapy and behavior modification, so long as this procedure promises to maximize the happiness of society as a whole.

Taking the exact opposite position from Menninger, Lewis raises a number of challenging objections. It may be acceptable, he says, to use the criminal as a means to society's ends, but only if it has first been established that the criminal deserves it. Otherwise, the so-called humanitarians might find themselves in a situation where "making an example" of an innocent but disgraced individual might serve to maximize happiness; whereas, on the other hand, letting a guilty but popular person go free might also maximize happiness. But either alternative is intolerable! Lewis protests. He concludes that the therapeutic model of punishment is actually cruel, unjust, and inhumane after all.